1.14.2005
And now the hard part, President Abbas
After Arafat
The election of Mahmoud Abbas in the freest and fairest elections ever held in the Arab world, a potential boost for a renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace process, was a remarkable achievement for Palestinians. They rose to one of the most important moments in their national life with great discipline, focus and resolve, clearly surprising both their supporters and detractors.
But Abbas's victory masks deep divisions and contradictions in Palestinian politics that threaten his viability as an effective leader. Indeed, unless Palestinians, with Israeli and American help, work to overcome these challenges, a huge opportunity for Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian peace will be lost.
Palestinian hunger for real politics and choices and, above all, freedom from the sclerotic and chaotic system under Yasser Arafat had been building for years, and after his death they managed a difficult transition remarkably well. Fatah controlled its own internal politics and presented a unified front and one candidate. At the same time, the Palestinians negotiated election arrangements with the Israelis and organized a credible presidential election of a sort unseen anywhere else in the Arab world.
Now comes the hard part. Abbas must confront two complicated challenges left over from the Arafat years even before he begins to negotiate with Israel. Arafat is gone, but his legacy still hangs over Palestine.
The first is the lack of legitimacy: Following the founder of a national movement is never easy. A successor can bask in reflected legitimacy, but never really possess its power. Abbas may be the candidate of continuity, and his authority is validated by elections. But he lacks the historic legitimacy associated with the armed struggle, the sacrifice and the personal hardships that defined Arafat's persona.
Moreover, unlike Arafat, he is likely to be constrained by a younger generation of Palestinians who resent the old guard.
Legitimacy may eventually come to Arafat's successor, but it will take time, and it will be driven by his capacity to produce results for Palestinians. Indeed, unless Abbas can deliver good governance and a process to end the Israeli occupation, his authority and power may be short-lived.
Second, there is the Mogadishu syndrome: The greatest challenge Abbas now faces is how to impose control on the warlords who have become rife in Palestine and to recreate a single security force. No state can be credible when rival groups using guns and terror proliferate, whether they are loosely organized, as in the case of the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigade, or diciplined, as in the case of Hamas.
No Palestinian leader - and Abbas is certainly no exception - will seek to impose his authority by force of arms with Israel occupying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Instead, he is likely to try to change circumstances on the ground in a way that increases his legitimacy at the expense of those who oppose him. Only when he can show political and economic gains might he credibly say to the opposition and to the public (which now has something to lose): If you use the gun, we will take it from you.
As the Bush administration considers how to take advantage of the new opportunities, it needs to keep these Palestinian realities in mind. This does not mean giving the Palestinians a pass on fighting terror and ending incitement. There are steps that the Palestinian Authority can and must take: going after "ticking bombs"; countering smuggling; rooting out Qassan rocket production; and cooperating on security matters with the Israelis.
But it does mean that Americans and Israelis must empower Abbas with the capabilities and the political cover to take the tough decisions that lie ahead.
This involves U.S. material support and training for the security services, as during the 1990s, and the marshaling of European and Arab economic support so that the Palestinian Authority - and not Hamas - is delivering services to Palestinians. On the political side, it means helping Israelis and Palestinians launch a negotiating process that can lead over time to a permanent solution based on two states living in peace and security.
This year offers a real opportunity to break the four-year Israeli-Palestinian stalemate. But it also calls to mind the old adage: Never pray for something you really don't want.
The Bush administration and most Israelis prayed for Arafat's passing and worked to promote it. He's gone now, and the question is whether we are prepared to take Abbas seriously and work to empower him for a real negotiating process - and whether there is a real two-state solution to negotiate once we do.
(Aaron David Miller is president of Seeds of Peace and served as an adviser on Arab-Israeli affairs to six U.S. secretaries of state. )
