2.06.2005
A Realigning Election
From the February 14 / February 21, 2005 issue: President Bush never accepted the notion that Iraqis or other Arab or Muslim peoples are not "ready" for democracy. As a result millions of Iraqis (and Afghans) have now voted.
by Robert Kagan and William Kristol
02/14/2005 in «Weekly Standard»
THE DAY AFTER IRAQIS WENT to the polls, the London Independent commented, "In the long term, it is possible that yesterday's elections in Iraq may be seen as marking the start of great change across the whole region." Needless to say, the editors hastened to add that it would be "utterly wrong, now or in the future, for President Bush or the prime minister to claim that Iraq's elections vindicate their invasion." But the first statement was by far the more striking, both because it came from an antiwar, anti-Bush newspaper and because it was undeniably true.
Let's set aside for the moment President Bush's two recent speeches, and all the doctrinal debates they have spurred, and simply focus on what has actually happened, in the real world, over the past year. First, there were the elections in Afghanistan last October. Despite predictions of disaster, eight million Afghans voted for the first time in their war-savaged lives. Afghan women, who but three years before were among the most oppressed people on earth, were able to cast ballots as full-fledged citizens. As one Afghan told a New York Times reporter, "In the whole history of Afghanistan this is the first time we come and choose our leader in democratic process and free condition. I feel very proud and I feel very happy." The Times reported that the man, a Tajik, had voted for Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun.
Then, in December, came the crisis and democratic triumph in Ukraine. Elections stolen by a corrupt Ukrainian government with the connivance of Russia's ruler, Vladimir Putin, were reversed by a massive display of "people power" in the streets of Kiev and other Ukrainian cities. A new round of elections brought some 27 million Ukrainians out to vote--roughly three-quarters of those registered--in what will go down in history as the "Orange Revolution." "This is the people's victory," one man told a Washington Post reporter. "Ukraine will finally achieve what it wanted when it got its independence from the Soviet Union. Democracy will finally reign in this country. It won't happen overnight, but it's begun."
Then, last month, the Palestinian people held elections for a new prime minister, the first in nine years. There, too, turnout was huge, and the new Palestinian prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas, received an overwhelming majority of the votes. As one senior Fatah leader told the Washington Post, "This is a historic vote for us. The most important thing is not the winner. The most important thing is to see the Palestinian people committed to the principle of democracy."
And this commitment has improved the chances for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Israel is beginning the process of withdrawing from West Bank towns, as well as from the Gaza strip, and has released hundreds of Palestinian prisoners. Prime Minister Abbas appears to be taking serious steps toward ending Palestinian attacks on Israel. And on February 8, Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon and Prime Minister Abbas will hold a summit in Egypt, the first such summit in nearly two years.
The elections in Palestine were critical to this progress, as was the death of Yasser Arafat. President Bush had all along insisted there could be no progress toward peace so long as Arafat remained in power, and that any progress would come as a result of new, democratic elections in Palestine. The president was pilloried in Europe, and by some in the United States, for holding to that position over the past two years. Now, it appears, he has been proven right.
Finally, there were the elections in Iraq. We don't need to add to the stories that Americans already know well, of millions of Iraqis risking their lives to cast votes, defying the terrorists who threatened to kill them and in some cases succeeded. But it is worth contemplating whether, as the Independent suggests, the Iraq elections may mark "the start of great change across the whole region."
Not so long ago, indeed right up until the day of the elections, this kind of thinking was treated as delusional. The vast majority of the American foreign policy establishment--Democrat and Republican, left, right, and center--ridiculed the whole notion that "democracy" should be America's goal in Iraq, not to mention across the broader Middle East and Muslim world. Even the community of professional democracy "experts" cluck-clucked at the Bush administration's "childish fantasies." Larry Diamond, perhaps the dean of that community, flatly declared several weeks before the elections in Iraq that they would "grease the slide to civil war."
Indeed, even as millions of Iraqis were casting their votes, we were being told, in Newsweek, in the New Republic, and elsewhere, that their votes were essentially meaningless. The "wrong" people would be elected, because the Iraqis are not decent enough, "liberal" enough, to elect the right people. "Elections are not democracy!" we were reminded. True enough. Nor does one election guarantee "liberalism." But, the fact is there can be neither democracy nor liberalism without elections.
And then there is this simple point: How can anyone living in this flourishing democracy tell the people of Iraq that they should not vote for their own leaders, that they are not "ready"? President Bush is sometimes accused of arrogance, but the true and appalling arrogance consists of telling the Iraqi people that they are not capable of electing the right kind of people. And are we so afraid of letting the Shia, who make up more than 60 percent of the Iraqi population, or the Kurds, who make up about 20 percent, win their fair share of votes in a free election? Are we really willing to deny these people the right to choose their own representatives?
Thankfully, President Bush never accepted the notion that Iraqis or other Arab or Muslim peoples are not "ready" for democracy. As a result millions of Iraqis (and Afghans) have now voted. How will this remarkable exercise of democracy affect the rest of the Arab and Muslim world? We remain confident that progress toward liberal democracy in Iraq will increase the chances that governments in the Middle East will open up, and that the peoples of the Middle East will demand their rights. And the chances increase every time the president singles out nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, or Iran and Syria, for special mention, as he did in the State of the Union. Words do matter, especially against the backdrop of deeds in Iraq and Afghanistan. There will, for example, be elections in Lebanon this summer, where an opposition victory could spell the beginning of the end of Syria's imperial role in that country. As for Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, you don't have to take our word for it. Jordan's King Abdullah put it best: "People are waking up. [Arab] leaders understand that they have to push reform forward, and I don't think there is any looking back."
Here in the United States, the partisan reaction to the recent successes has been truly stunning. Never have so many been so miserable in the face of such good news. The Middle East experts who predicted disaster have not been able to bring themselves to acknowledge that it wasn't a disaster after all. Instead, they have simply shifted to predicting disaster in the future, or to falsely claiming that Iraqi Shia, who follow Ayatollah Sistani's lead, are tools of Iran. The democracy experts have been particularly egregious as well. Has their hatred of Bush made it impossible for them actually to applaud democratic elections when they occur?
We also have to admit being disappointed at the reaction of Democrats. We have no naive expectation of bipartisanship. We recall perfectly well how many Republicans refused to give Bill Clinton credit when he deserved it, in Bosnia and Kosovo. Nor is there anything surprising in Ted Kennedy's monotonous counsel of doom: In Kennedy's world, as in John Kerry's, the dream will never die, and the Vietnam war will never end. But where are the other Democrats, even a handful of them, to stand up and applaud the gains of democracy around the world?
There was a time when the spread of freedom was a foreign policy ideal Democrats cherished. In 1984, when El Salvador held its own round of miraculous elections in the midst of a bloody civil war, many prominent Democrats threw their support behind Ronald Reagan's policies in that country--not because they liked Reagan but because they cared about spreading democracy, and fighting communism, in Central America. And in 1999, while many Republicans attacked Clinton's intervention in Kosovo, some stood by the president and even criticized their colleagues. This magazine supported Clinton throughout the Kosovo conflict, not because we were exceptionally fond of Clinton, and not because we had complete confidence that he was prosecuting the war effectively, but simply because, at the end of the day, we thought he was doing the right thing. Is it so hard for Democrats, with the next presidential election still almost four years off, to overcome their Bush-hatred just for a moment in order to join in supporting the cause of freedom and democracy?
The next steps in Iraq will of course still be difficult. In particular, the brave Iraqi voters deserve the commitment of the United States to remain fully engaged in the struggle to defeat the terrorists. And even as the security situation improves, as we trust it will, the political process will remain messy. No one should expect miracles. But the fact remains that it is today more possible than ever before to envision a future in which the Middle East and the Muslim world truly are transformed. For this, no one will deserve more credit than George W. Bush.
by Robert Kagan and William Kristol
02/14/2005 in «Weekly Standard»
THE DAY AFTER IRAQIS WENT to the polls, the London Independent commented, "In the long term, it is possible that yesterday's elections in Iraq may be seen as marking the start of great change across the whole region." Needless to say, the editors hastened to add that it would be "utterly wrong, now or in the future, for President Bush or the prime minister to claim that Iraq's elections vindicate their invasion." But the first statement was by far the more striking, both because it came from an antiwar, anti-Bush newspaper and because it was undeniably true.
Let's set aside for the moment President Bush's two recent speeches, and all the doctrinal debates they have spurred, and simply focus on what has actually happened, in the real world, over the past year. First, there were the elections in Afghanistan last October. Despite predictions of disaster, eight million Afghans voted for the first time in their war-savaged lives. Afghan women, who but three years before were among the most oppressed people on earth, were able to cast ballots as full-fledged citizens. As one Afghan told a New York Times reporter, "In the whole history of Afghanistan this is the first time we come and choose our leader in democratic process and free condition. I feel very proud and I feel very happy." The Times reported that the man, a Tajik, had voted for Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun.
Then, in December, came the crisis and democratic triumph in Ukraine. Elections stolen by a corrupt Ukrainian government with the connivance of Russia's ruler, Vladimir Putin, were reversed by a massive display of "people power" in the streets of Kiev and other Ukrainian cities. A new round of elections brought some 27 million Ukrainians out to vote--roughly three-quarters of those registered--in what will go down in history as the "Orange Revolution." "This is the people's victory," one man told a Washington Post reporter. "Ukraine will finally achieve what it wanted when it got its independence from the Soviet Union. Democracy will finally reign in this country. It won't happen overnight, but it's begun."
Then, last month, the Palestinian people held elections for a new prime minister, the first in nine years. There, too, turnout was huge, and the new Palestinian prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas, received an overwhelming majority of the votes. As one senior Fatah leader told the Washington Post, "This is a historic vote for us. The most important thing is not the winner. The most important thing is to see the Palestinian people committed to the principle of democracy."
And this commitment has improved the chances for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Israel is beginning the process of withdrawing from West Bank towns, as well as from the Gaza strip, and has released hundreds of Palestinian prisoners. Prime Minister Abbas appears to be taking serious steps toward ending Palestinian attacks on Israel. And on February 8, Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon and Prime Minister Abbas will hold a summit in Egypt, the first such summit in nearly two years.
The elections in Palestine were critical to this progress, as was the death of Yasser Arafat. President Bush had all along insisted there could be no progress toward peace so long as Arafat remained in power, and that any progress would come as a result of new, democratic elections in Palestine. The president was pilloried in Europe, and by some in the United States, for holding to that position over the past two years. Now, it appears, he has been proven right.
Finally, there were the elections in Iraq. We don't need to add to the stories that Americans already know well, of millions of Iraqis risking their lives to cast votes, defying the terrorists who threatened to kill them and in some cases succeeded. But it is worth contemplating whether, as the Independent suggests, the Iraq elections may mark "the start of great change across the whole region."
Not so long ago, indeed right up until the day of the elections, this kind of thinking was treated as delusional. The vast majority of the American foreign policy establishment--Democrat and Republican, left, right, and center--ridiculed the whole notion that "democracy" should be America's goal in Iraq, not to mention across the broader Middle East and Muslim world. Even the community of professional democracy "experts" cluck-clucked at the Bush administration's "childish fantasies." Larry Diamond, perhaps the dean of that community, flatly declared several weeks before the elections in Iraq that they would "grease the slide to civil war."
Indeed, even as millions of Iraqis were casting their votes, we were being told, in Newsweek, in the New Republic, and elsewhere, that their votes were essentially meaningless. The "wrong" people would be elected, because the Iraqis are not decent enough, "liberal" enough, to elect the right people. "Elections are not democracy!" we were reminded. True enough. Nor does one election guarantee "liberalism." But, the fact is there can be neither democracy nor liberalism without elections.
And then there is this simple point: How can anyone living in this flourishing democracy tell the people of Iraq that they should not vote for their own leaders, that they are not "ready"? President Bush is sometimes accused of arrogance, but the true and appalling arrogance consists of telling the Iraqi people that they are not capable of electing the right kind of people. And are we so afraid of letting the Shia, who make up more than 60 percent of the Iraqi population, or the Kurds, who make up about 20 percent, win their fair share of votes in a free election? Are we really willing to deny these people the right to choose their own representatives?
Thankfully, President Bush never accepted the notion that Iraqis or other Arab or Muslim peoples are not "ready" for democracy. As a result millions of Iraqis (and Afghans) have now voted. How will this remarkable exercise of democracy affect the rest of the Arab and Muslim world? We remain confident that progress toward liberal democracy in Iraq will increase the chances that governments in the Middle East will open up, and that the peoples of the Middle East will demand their rights. And the chances increase every time the president singles out nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, or Iran and Syria, for special mention, as he did in the State of the Union. Words do matter, especially against the backdrop of deeds in Iraq and Afghanistan. There will, for example, be elections in Lebanon this summer, where an opposition victory could spell the beginning of the end of Syria's imperial role in that country. As for Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, you don't have to take our word for it. Jordan's King Abdullah put it best: "People are waking up. [Arab] leaders understand that they have to push reform forward, and I don't think there is any looking back."
Here in the United States, the partisan reaction to the recent successes has been truly stunning. Never have so many been so miserable in the face of such good news. The Middle East experts who predicted disaster have not been able to bring themselves to acknowledge that it wasn't a disaster after all. Instead, they have simply shifted to predicting disaster in the future, or to falsely claiming that Iraqi Shia, who follow Ayatollah Sistani's lead, are tools of Iran. The democracy experts have been particularly egregious as well. Has their hatred of Bush made it impossible for them actually to applaud democratic elections when they occur?
We also have to admit being disappointed at the reaction of Democrats. We have no naive expectation of bipartisanship. We recall perfectly well how many Republicans refused to give Bill Clinton credit when he deserved it, in Bosnia and Kosovo. Nor is there anything surprising in Ted Kennedy's monotonous counsel of doom: In Kennedy's world, as in John Kerry's, the dream will never die, and the Vietnam war will never end. But where are the other Democrats, even a handful of them, to stand up and applaud the gains of democracy around the world?
There was a time when the spread of freedom was a foreign policy ideal Democrats cherished. In 1984, when El Salvador held its own round of miraculous elections in the midst of a bloody civil war, many prominent Democrats threw their support behind Ronald Reagan's policies in that country--not because they liked Reagan but because they cared about spreading democracy, and fighting communism, in Central America. And in 1999, while many Republicans attacked Clinton's intervention in Kosovo, some stood by the president and even criticized their colleagues. This magazine supported Clinton throughout the Kosovo conflict, not because we were exceptionally fond of Clinton, and not because we had complete confidence that he was prosecuting the war effectively, but simply because, at the end of the day, we thought he was doing the right thing. Is it so hard for Democrats, with the next presidential election still almost four years off, to overcome their Bush-hatred just for a moment in order to join in supporting the cause of freedom and democracy?
The next steps in Iraq will of course still be difficult. In particular, the brave Iraqi voters deserve the commitment of the United States to remain fully engaged in the struggle to defeat the terrorists. And even as the security situation improves, as we trust it will, the political process will remain messy. No one should expect miracles. But the fact remains that it is today more possible than ever before to envision a future in which the Middle East and the Muslim world truly are transformed. For this, no one will deserve more credit than George W. Bush.
2.04.2005
Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO?
By Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson
Ronald D. Asmus is executive director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States’ Transatlantic Center in Brussels. Bruce P. Jackson is president of the Project on Transitional Democracies. They have been the Democratic and Republican heads of the U.S. Committee on NATO. This essay grew out of a U.S.-European-Israeli dialogue supported by the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
in «Policy Review»
Over the course of the past year, a debate has started over whether Israel should rethink its relationship with the core institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community, namely nato and the eu, and if so, how. The impetus for this rethinking has originated both in Israel and on both sides of the Atlantic. At first blush, an outside observer might ask: Why are we having this debate — and why now? The answer to that question has several parts.
First, the Euro-Atlantic community itself has undergone a profound process of transformation since the end of the Cold War, shifting its strategic focus east and south toward the wider Middle East. That shift started with the epochal fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the ensuing collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and the eventual unraveling of the former Soviet Union. The delayed aftershocks of that geopolitical earthquake are still being felt today, as we can see in the dramatic events unfolding in Ukraine.
This revolutionary set of events has led to a dramatic strategic response by the West. Since the early 1990s, nato and the eu community have expanded across the eastern half of the continent, nearly doubling their size and membership to help consolidate democracy and security across the new Europe. They have intervened beyond their borders to stop ethnic wars in the Balkans and have developed into pan-European institutions stretching from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea and Turkey in the south. Today they have stretched their borders to the northern edge of the wider Middle East and are assuming new responsibilities across this wider security space.
The other seminal event reshaping the Euro-Atlantic community was September 11, 2001 and Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States. Those attacks accelerated the strategic shift of the West away from an insular focus on threats in Europe to those emanating from beyond it. They drove home the fact that the greatest threats to Euro-Atlantic security may well originate from regions such as the wider Middle East. To be sure, there is still unfinished business in Europe and Eurasia. A dictator remains in power in Belarus, Russia is moving in an anti-democratic direction, Ukraine’s democratic future must still be consolidated, and a final settlement remains outstanding in the Balkans. Integrating Turkey into the eu and developing a strategy for the wider Black Sea region remain major challenges.
While complex questions of policy still confront Washington and Brussels, the strategic contours of a new Euro-Atlantic geopolitical system are beginning to settle. That system has now anchored Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics; it is working to consolidate peace and security in the Balkans and is starting to reach out across the Black Sea region. It now stretches across the European continent — possibly to include a democratizing Ukraine now seeking to turn west. Despite the many painful debates that lie in front of it, the eu has decided to embrace the full integration of Turkey, which in turn will consolidate the Euro-Atlantic community’s border on the northern edge of the Middle East. Finally, the rift across the Atlantic and within Europe created by the Iraq war is gradually being overcome and the strategic unity of the West laboriously reestablished.
One strategic question remaining from the twentieth century is the relationship of Israel to a Euro-Atlantic community that is coming closer and closer to its borders. Closely related to the process of strategic redefinition of the Euro-Atlantic community is what we would term the perishability of revolutionary time. For the past decade there has been a plastic or malleable quality to the process of reshaping the Euro-Atlantic community. This window would seem to offer the United States, Europe, and Israel an unprecedented opportunity to reshape their own relations in ways inconceivable in previous periods. It is difficult to see how these quite extraordinary circumstances will persist indefinitely. Therefore, a compelling reason to address this question now is that we may not have the window of opportunity to address it again in the foreseeable future.
As important as the residual challenges of securing peace in Europe are, the deadly threat to Western societies posed by the nexus of new anti-Western fundamentalist ideologies, terrorism, and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction in the wider Middle East is pulling the Euro-Atlantic community into this region. That is why nato has embraced its first modest missions in Afghanistan and, to a lesser degree, in Iraq. Under American prodding, the West is debating whether and how to pursue a long-term strategy aimed at the transformation and democratization of the region as a whole, and the U.S.-European agenda is increasingly dominated by how to cooperate on questions ranging from Iran to Middle East peace. The old compartmentalization between a European and Middle Eastern security space is crumbling, and in this context, the question of whether and how Israel relates to and is included in broader Western strategy has inevitably arisen.
The second part of the answer to why the issue of rethinking and upgrading Israel’s relations with nato and the eu is now being raised has to do with events in Israel and the region. With the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the second intifada, the vision of Israel successfully integrating itself into a new and transforming Middle East was dealt a severe setback. The vision of closer integration between Israelis and Palestinians has been supplanted by a desire on both sides for separation. The prospect of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons — possibly encouraging other countries like Egypt to consider the same — would pose a very real threat to Israeli security. While Israel could be a great beneficiary of a Western strategy aimed at transforming and democratizing the region, should such a strategy backfire or fail, Israel would be one of the first countries to feel the consequences.
We want to be clear on one point. Much of the recent discussion in the West about Israel and nato has focused on a possible peacekeeping or monitoring role for Alliance forces in connection with a possible Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. But what some Israeli strategic thinkers are starting to discuss — and what we are addressing here — is something different, namely an upgraded strategic relationship between Israel and Euro-Atlantic institutions like nato and the eu that would lead to increasingly closer ties and could include eventual membership. Such an upgraded relationship could become a crucial part of an overall package aimed at securing a peace settlement as well as a part of an overall reassessment of nato and eu ties in the region. It would not exclude nato and/or the eu from assuming some role in a future peace settlement. But the strategic purpose would be different, namely to bring Israel closer to and anchor it in the Euro-Atlantic community.
These are the issues and questions that some far-sighted Israelis have also started to pose. What seems remarkable to us, however, is not that they are now being posed, but rather that Israelis have not been more curious and assertive in exploring such opportunities for enhancing Israel’s security and long-term viability. At a minimum, both Israel and the West will need to review what kind of relationship does or does not make sense as the European and Middle Eastern security spaces increasingly overlap. Should Israel seek closer relations with nato and the eu? Or should Israel remain outside? We believe Israel may have a unique window in which it can seek to realign itself vis-à-vis Euro-Atlantic institutions, and we turn now to a sketch of the reasons why such a realignment is in the interests of Israel, the United States, and Europe.
What’s in it for Israel?
The proper place to start such an analysis is Israel. After all, if Israelis are not interested in seeking an upgraded1 relationship with the Euro-Atlantic community, then there is little point in this exercise. Why might Israel be interested in such a step? It is, of course, up to the Israelis themselves to determine their national interest. Yet an outsider might offer the following thoughts for consideration.
First, at a minimum, Israel should want to have closer ties with nato and the eu simply because they are actors who are coming closer to Israel geographically and who are developing strategies to shape the Middle Eastern neighborhood in which Israel lives. Israel should aspire to have the closest possible relations with the actors and institutions setting those policies.
Second, a new and upgraded relationship between Israel and the Euro-Atlantic community could become a critical element in helping to provide the security Israel will need to take steps to make peace with a Palestinian state in the Middle East. Anchoring Israel more closely with nato and the eu can reduce the sense of isolation that Israel feels. In a post-Oslo political environment, such a step could be especially important in convincing a skeptical Israeli public to support such a settlement.
Third, an upgrading of Israel’s relations with the institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community could play an important role in ending Israel’s political and diplomatic isolation and strengthen Israel’s position vis-à-vis other parts of the world, including its adversaries in the Middle East.
Last but perhaps most important, the American connection is a necessary but not necessarily a sufficient condition for Israel’s long-term survival and viability. It is and will remain the key Western anchor for Israel, but it is also clear that the country would benefit from a second European or Euro-Atlantic anchor as well. This is especially true if one views Israel’s needs in a broader strategic sense extending beyond military security and including economic markets, access to technology, currency stability, etc. Developing closer relations with the Euro-Atlantic community can also serve as an insurance policy in case Israel is ever faced with a rapidly deteriorating security situation in the region. In such a scenario, Israel might feel the need to seek closer strategic relations with the West. It would make sense to lay the foundation for such an option in advance and before such a crisis.
We would be the last people to question the importance of Israel’s American connection. Like most Americans, we are proud of our country’s track record of supporting Israel. Yet it is not fanciful to raise the question of what might happen in, for example, 20 years’ time if the U.S. were embroiled in a conflict in the Pacific and then also faced with a Middle East conflict, one in which protecting Israel could expose us to terrorist attacks in the American homeland. Even if we agree that Americans see themselves as defenders of Israel (for reasons of history, faith, and cultural values), it is hard to see why Israel should rely exclusively on America’s assurance forever. Few states in history have relied upon a single alliance and an informal one at that. Most have sought to construct a web of interlocking relationships as a strategic insurance policy. It seems only prudent for Israel to seek a multilateral complement to a strong bilateral relationship.
This list of potential benefits should be matched by what some Israelis could view as the possible downsides or “costs” of such a move. One set of concerns centers on Israel’s deeply rooted belief in the need for political and strategic self-reliance and its reluctance to rely on allies. Related to this is Israel’s own negative history with and distrust of multilateral institutions, especially the United Nations. Israel will think hard about whether closer relations with the eu and nato could constrain its freedom of maneuver on core issues central to its security.
A second set of concerns has to do with Israel’s own identity and its relationship with Europe. The question of national identity is a vast subject. Suffice it to mention several key issues: Do Israelis today see themselves as a democratic Jewish state whose values are fundamentally the same as those of the Euro-Atlantic community? Or do they view themselves as a people essentially betrayed by Europe? If the answer is the former, then there is no reason why Israel should not seek a close relationship with and perhaps even inclusion in those institutions created to defend and sustain those values. If the answer is the latter, however, it is hard to see why Israelis would see a strategy of returning Israel to European institutions as desirable.
As Americans, we sympathize with feelings of Israeli exceptionalism. Yet, as Euro-Atlanticists, it strikes us as a bit odd to argue that in terms of value Israel is so distinct that it cannot fit in the broader Euro-Atlantic community, while Erdogan’s Turkey can and does. It also strikes us as curious that Israel sees itself as a close American ally yet at times is nervous about developing close relationships with other close American allies. The reason is clear: Israel’s political relations with the United States are excellent, but with Europe they are troubled. Many Israelis today doubt Europe’s commitment to Israel and are concerned about growing anti-Semitic currents on the continent. Israelis fear that closer ties with Europe will generate greater pressure for a peace settlement on unfavorable terms. These issues and fears in Israel need to be faced and resolved, something that will happen only in a real dialogue with Europe.
A third and final set of doubts has to do with the viability and cohesion of the Euro-Atlantic community itself. After all, why should Israel make a major move to get close to the Euro-Atlantic community if that community itself is in danger of falling apart? Are Americans and Europeans capable of overcoming the divisions of recent years and will they undertake this kind of strategy? Even if the Euro-Atlantic community regains its footing and comes back together again, many Israelis would ask whether such an upgrade in Israel’s relations with the West is really on offer.
Many of these concerns are real and need to be discussed and addressed at length. Even this brief survey suggests that there is a compelling case for Israelis to explore the option of such an upgrade and its potential benefits and downsides. But such a cost-benefit analysis also requires us to look at American and European interests and views.
What about the U.S.?
As the main supporter of Israel, the United States shares many of the interests and benefits listed above. This is a case where the interests of both sides potentially dovetail, as Washington clearly would benefit from a strategy that would make Israel more secure and that would enhance its long-term viability as a country and nation. In addition, the following considerations should be taken into account:
First, the U.S. would acquire partners and assistance in sharing the burden of helping to secure Israel and anchor her to the West. To be sure, Europe, by assuming more burden and responsibility, would also gain more potential influence. But it is unlikely to displace the United States as the senior partner and friend of Israel in any meaningful way barring some radical crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. Americans can afford to be relaxed. There is no danger of American influence with Israel being marginalized.
Second, the transatlantic rift over how to deal with Israel would presumably be narrowed significantly if not overcome, thus eliminating one of the current sources of tension in U.S.-European relations. One way to help narrow the gap between the United States and Europe is to force both sides to work together in developing a more common approach. It is noteworthy how deep differences often suddenly narrow when one has to share responsibility and contemplate joint action.
Third, a common Euro-Atlantic policy toward Israel would also mean that the Arab world would be less able to play on differences between the United States and Europe. Over time, this could increase the U.S. negotiating leverage and position in the Arab world.
To be sure, there will be Euro-skeptical voices in the United States who will question such an approach. They will argue that ensuring Israel’s security through a bilateral relationship with the United States is easier, more flexible, and perhaps even advantageous. They would claim that the United States would be making a mistake by “allowing” Europeans to acquire a more important voice and greater influence in Israel and in the Middle East. Yet how can we assert that Israel is part of the “West” but also insist that developing Israel’s ties with the core institutions of the West is somehow too hard or complicated? At the end of the day, if Israel makes it clear that it desires a closer relationship with Europe, then such voices are likely to be muted and limited in their impact.
As Americans, we discuss U.S. policy toward Israel frequently with our friends and colleagues. In our view, it is clear that the opening of Euro-Atlantic institutions to Israel would help resolve the moral and strategic contradictions that chafe within U.S. policy. For example, the U.S. proposes to launch the greatest democracy program for the wider Middle East ever conceived but cannot define the role of a democratic Israel in that program. nato has upgraded a “26 plus 1” relationship with Russia because Moscow can assist the West on terror and proliferation, but not with Israel in spite of its obvious potential contribution in these areas. Americans are overwhelmingly convinced that Turkey is an integral member of the Euro-Atlantic community but unsure or vague about whether Israel is or should be. We believe that U.S. policymakers should welcome a closer Israeli relationship with key Euro-Atlantic institutions and that such a step would help resolve these contradictions.
A good deal of political legwork would undoubtedly be required on the American side as well to make this official U.S. policy. Yet, arguably, the United States would have the fewest problems adopting such a strategy. It will not be the obstacle if Israel wants to move forward.
And what about Europe?
he real question lies in Europe and in European attitudes. In many ways, this is the key issue, since Europeans not only run the eu and have a decisive voice in nato as well, but also have a more troubled relationship with Israel. Yet here, too, there are arguably several ways in which Europe could benefit from such an upgrade:
First, if such an upgrade was part and parcel of a move toward peace in the Middle East, the eu would move from the sidelines to center stage in the peace process and Middle Eastern politics more generally. If Europeans truly believe that achieving Middle East peace is critical, this is one way in which they can contribute to this goal. It could acquire the kind of major role many European leaders have long aspired to have — and give an enormous boost to European diplomatic credibility and standing in the region and beyond.
Second, Europe’s own strained relationship with Israel could be mended. The current situation, in which the eu has extremely close economic and other ties with Israel but almost no meaningful political or strategic dialogue, could be overcome. A Europe that is more engaged on the ground is also likely to be a more responsible one, including in Israeli eyes.
Third, obviously some in Europe may fear that such a move would mean abandoning Europe’s policy of being “even-handed” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and undercut Europe’s standing in the Arab world. One should question whether that needs to be the case. If handled correctly, such a step might actually lead pro-Western moderate Arab states to seek their own closer ties with the Euro-Atlantic community as well, something we should welcome.
There are three big questions about the feasibility of Europeans making such a leap of strategic imagination to embrace such a bold strategy. The first is whether European leaders have the vision and courage to take such a step and whether it is domestically sustainable given the kind of critical sentiments toward Israel one finds today in many parts of Europe. As we have debated this issue over the last year, the initial response of many European colleagues has been that Israel and Palestine must first make peace, and then and only then should we discuss bringing Israel closer to and perhaps into our Euro-Atlantic institutions. We would suggest Europeans need to move beyond this static and reactive approach, flip or reverse this logic, and think in terms of what they and we can do and offer in advance of or parallel to moves toward peace in order to reinforce that process. Indeed, it is only by thinking in these more dynamic terms that Europe can acquire the sort of role and influence it wants.
The second and perhaps equally important question for many Europeans will be whether Europe can find a way to upgrade its relations with Israel yet sustain what it views as its special commitment to the Palestinians as well as to key Arab states. As mentioned earlier, it would be simplistic to assume that such a move would automatically lead to deterioration in Europe’s relations with the Arab world. Indeed, if handled properly, one could argue that such a move would enhance Europe’s prestige and influence in the Arab world. But this underscores that European countries will be more comfortable in upgrading Israel’s relations with Europe if that step can be embedded in a broader regional approach that also contains opportunities to step up outreach to key Arab states. This is a question of packaging.
Finally, there is the question of whether the eu will be willing to assume the kind of added responsibility such a strategic shift would entail — and whether it would be willing to do so in partnership with the United States. Many Europeans could be concerned that they are being drawn into potential conflicts and assuming new risk in the region. Yet at the end of the day, it may be far easier for Europe to mend its relations with Israel in a trans-Atlantic framework. Many Europeans are also aware that the problematic relationship between Israel and Europe also creates a long-term strain on U.S.-European relations, which manifests itself in doubt about the reliability of the U.S.-European partnership in the Middle East. Establishing a better Israeli-European relationship would not only serve to enhance Israeli’s security, but also mitigate those doubts.
Where to start
or the reasons laid out above, we believe there is a compelling strategic argument why Israel should explore the option of building closer ties to the Euro-Atlantic community. As noted, we are living in a moment of strategic fluidity — both across the Atlantic and in the Middle East. The future contours of the Euro-Atlantic community are likely to settle in the years ahead. The question is whether they will come to an end on the northern edge of the wider Middle East and stop with Turkey and the Black Sea region — or whether they will reach down to embrace a democratic country like Israel as well. In the Middle East itself, we may be entering a new phase of strategic fluidity as well — in connection with Prime Minister Sharon’s disengagement plan for Gaza, the election of a new Palestinian leadership, and in the region more broadly.
For all these reasons, this is the right moment for Israel to decide whether it wants to pursue a Euro-Atlantic upgrade. Both Europe and Israel need to participate equally with the United States in such a rethinking. Movement will be required on both the European and Israeli sides to make progress. As a first step, it is nevertheless Israel that needs to decide that it wants to seek a new and expanded relationship with the Euro-Atlantic community.
The instruments or tools to do so already exist. The recent Istanbul nato summit has for the first time opened the door to creating a separate bilateral Israeli-nato relationship outside of and in addition to the Mediterranean Dialogue. Israel has a friend in the current secretary general of nato, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. And the nato format would seem more manageable in political terms since the U.S. is also involved and it has a greater focus on security issues that are of immediate concern.
Israel today actually has a much closer relationship with the eu than it has with nato — arguably closer than any other non-eu member — but that relationship is non-strategic, politically stunted, and very much limited to trade, technology, and science. Yet here, too, the offer from the Essen summit of building a special relationship between the eu and Israel is still on the table. Moreover, the eu’s European Neighborhood Policy (enp) offers a broader framework within which the eu can deepen ties with both Israel and other countries in the region. The history of the past decade in terms of Euro-Atlantic outreach has shown that it is possible for the receiving country to fill initiatives like the enp with more substance than its drafters may originally have intended. From the bottom up, both the eu and nato would have to start to build a political and strategic relationship that could grow over time as well.
All long journeys start with small steps, and a strategic reorientation of the kind discussed is no different. It would require a top-down and bottom-up component. At the top there are a number of political issues — largely but not exclusively between Israel and Europe — that would have to be resolved and would undoubtedly take time. Progress toward a peace settlement with the Palestinians and clarity on Israel’s final borders undoubtedly are at the top of that list.
The scope of what is imaginable or possible is wide. It will depend upon the interest of the nato nations as well as Israel. Israel can start by turning to those nato nations that it considers to be friends and that are likely to be most interested in developing this relationship. They in turn can take the lead in creating opportunities for Israel to deepen its relationship through the plethora of existing partnership mechanisms — or by working with Israel in a subgroup of nato allies. Over time, Israel might aspire to develop the kind of close partnership relationship that countries like Sweden or Finland have developed over the past decade and enjoy today — a very close political relationship, close military interoperability, and the de facto yet unspoken option to join if the strategic environment ever makes such a move necessary.
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Note
1 A point on language: In this essay we use words like “upgrading” Israel’s relations with the Euro-Atlantic community or “anchoring” Israel to the West. These words include a spectrum of relationships ranging from closer ties up to and including possible membership. We reserve judgment at this stage on the exact form such an upgraded relationship would or should take. What we are talking about is the creation of a new and much closer relationship in which Israel both sees itself as part of the West and aspires to have the closest possible relationship with the Euro-Atlantic community — and one in which the United States and Europe think of and include Israel as a close partner and what might be termed a member of the Euro-Atlantic community’s extended family.
Ronald D. Asmus is executive director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States’ Transatlantic Center in Brussels. Bruce P. Jackson is president of the Project on Transitional Democracies. They have been the Democratic and Republican heads of the U.S. Committee on NATO. This essay grew out of a U.S.-European-Israeli dialogue supported by the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
in «Policy Review»
Over the course of the past year, a debate has started over whether Israel should rethink its relationship with the core institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community, namely nato and the eu, and if so, how. The impetus for this rethinking has originated both in Israel and on both sides of the Atlantic. At first blush, an outside observer might ask: Why are we having this debate — and why now? The answer to that question has several parts.
First, the Euro-Atlantic community itself has undergone a profound process of transformation since the end of the Cold War, shifting its strategic focus east and south toward the wider Middle East. That shift started with the epochal fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the ensuing collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and the eventual unraveling of the former Soviet Union. The delayed aftershocks of that geopolitical earthquake are still being felt today, as we can see in the dramatic events unfolding in Ukraine.
This revolutionary set of events has led to a dramatic strategic response by the West. Since the early 1990s, nato and the eu community have expanded across the eastern half of the continent, nearly doubling their size and membership to help consolidate democracy and security across the new Europe. They have intervened beyond their borders to stop ethnic wars in the Balkans and have developed into pan-European institutions stretching from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea and Turkey in the south. Today they have stretched their borders to the northern edge of the wider Middle East and are assuming new responsibilities across this wider security space.
The other seminal event reshaping the Euro-Atlantic community was September 11, 2001 and Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States. Those attacks accelerated the strategic shift of the West away from an insular focus on threats in Europe to those emanating from beyond it. They drove home the fact that the greatest threats to Euro-Atlantic security may well originate from regions such as the wider Middle East. To be sure, there is still unfinished business in Europe and Eurasia. A dictator remains in power in Belarus, Russia is moving in an anti-democratic direction, Ukraine’s democratic future must still be consolidated, and a final settlement remains outstanding in the Balkans. Integrating Turkey into the eu and developing a strategy for the wider Black Sea region remain major challenges.
While complex questions of policy still confront Washington and Brussels, the strategic contours of a new Euro-Atlantic geopolitical system are beginning to settle. That system has now anchored Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics; it is working to consolidate peace and security in the Balkans and is starting to reach out across the Black Sea region. It now stretches across the European continent — possibly to include a democratizing Ukraine now seeking to turn west. Despite the many painful debates that lie in front of it, the eu has decided to embrace the full integration of Turkey, which in turn will consolidate the Euro-Atlantic community’s border on the northern edge of the Middle East. Finally, the rift across the Atlantic and within Europe created by the Iraq war is gradually being overcome and the strategic unity of the West laboriously reestablished.
One strategic question remaining from the twentieth century is the relationship of Israel to a Euro-Atlantic community that is coming closer and closer to its borders. Closely related to the process of strategic redefinition of the Euro-Atlantic community is what we would term the perishability of revolutionary time. For the past decade there has been a plastic or malleable quality to the process of reshaping the Euro-Atlantic community. This window would seem to offer the United States, Europe, and Israel an unprecedented opportunity to reshape their own relations in ways inconceivable in previous periods. It is difficult to see how these quite extraordinary circumstances will persist indefinitely. Therefore, a compelling reason to address this question now is that we may not have the window of opportunity to address it again in the foreseeable future.
As important as the residual challenges of securing peace in Europe are, the deadly threat to Western societies posed by the nexus of new anti-Western fundamentalist ideologies, terrorism, and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction in the wider Middle East is pulling the Euro-Atlantic community into this region. That is why nato has embraced its first modest missions in Afghanistan and, to a lesser degree, in Iraq. Under American prodding, the West is debating whether and how to pursue a long-term strategy aimed at the transformation and democratization of the region as a whole, and the U.S.-European agenda is increasingly dominated by how to cooperate on questions ranging from Iran to Middle East peace. The old compartmentalization between a European and Middle Eastern security space is crumbling, and in this context, the question of whether and how Israel relates to and is included in broader Western strategy has inevitably arisen.
The second part of the answer to why the issue of rethinking and upgrading Israel’s relations with nato and the eu is now being raised has to do with events in Israel and the region. With the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the second intifada, the vision of Israel successfully integrating itself into a new and transforming Middle East was dealt a severe setback. The vision of closer integration between Israelis and Palestinians has been supplanted by a desire on both sides for separation. The prospect of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons — possibly encouraging other countries like Egypt to consider the same — would pose a very real threat to Israeli security. While Israel could be a great beneficiary of a Western strategy aimed at transforming and democratizing the region, should such a strategy backfire or fail, Israel would be one of the first countries to feel the consequences.
We want to be clear on one point. Much of the recent discussion in the West about Israel and nato has focused on a possible peacekeeping or monitoring role for Alliance forces in connection with a possible Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. But what some Israeli strategic thinkers are starting to discuss — and what we are addressing here — is something different, namely an upgraded strategic relationship between Israel and Euro-Atlantic institutions like nato and the eu that would lead to increasingly closer ties and could include eventual membership. Such an upgraded relationship could become a crucial part of an overall package aimed at securing a peace settlement as well as a part of an overall reassessment of nato and eu ties in the region. It would not exclude nato and/or the eu from assuming some role in a future peace settlement. But the strategic purpose would be different, namely to bring Israel closer to and anchor it in the Euro-Atlantic community.
These are the issues and questions that some far-sighted Israelis have also started to pose. What seems remarkable to us, however, is not that they are now being posed, but rather that Israelis have not been more curious and assertive in exploring such opportunities for enhancing Israel’s security and long-term viability. At a minimum, both Israel and the West will need to review what kind of relationship does or does not make sense as the European and Middle Eastern security spaces increasingly overlap. Should Israel seek closer relations with nato and the eu? Or should Israel remain outside? We believe Israel may have a unique window in which it can seek to realign itself vis-à-vis Euro-Atlantic institutions, and we turn now to a sketch of the reasons why such a realignment is in the interests of Israel, the United States, and Europe.
What’s in it for Israel?
The proper place to start such an analysis is Israel. After all, if Israelis are not interested in seeking an upgraded1 relationship with the Euro-Atlantic community, then there is little point in this exercise. Why might Israel be interested in such a step? It is, of course, up to the Israelis themselves to determine their national interest. Yet an outsider might offer the following thoughts for consideration.
First, at a minimum, Israel should want to have closer ties with nato and the eu simply because they are actors who are coming closer to Israel geographically and who are developing strategies to shape the Middle Eastern neighborhood in which Israel lives. Israel should aspire to have the closest possible relations with the actors and institutions setting those policies.
Second, a new and upgraded relationship between Israel and the Euro-Atlantic community could become a critical element in helping to provide the security Israel will need to take steps to make peace with a Palestinian state in the Middle East. Anchoring Israel more closely with nato and the eu can reduce the sense of isolation that Israel feels. In a post-Oslo political environment, such a step could be especially important in convincing a skeptical Israeli public to support such a settlement.
Third, an upgrading of Israel’s relations with the institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community could play an important role in ending Israel’s political and diplomatic isolation and strengthen Israel’s position vis-à-vis other parts of the world, including its adversaries in the Middle East.
Last but perhaps most important, the American connection is a necessary but not necessarily a sufficient condition for Israel’s long-term survival and viability. It is and will remain the key Western anchor for Israel, but it is also clear that the country would benefit from a second European or Euro-Atlantic anchor as well. This is especially true if one views Israel’s needs in a broader strategic sense extending beyond military security and including economic markets, access to technology, currency stability, etc. Developing closer relations with the Euro-Atlantic community can also serve as an insurance policy in case Israel is ever faced with a rapidly deteriorating security situation in the region. In such a scenario, Israel might feel the need to seek closer strategic relations with the West. It would make sense to lay the foundation for such an option in advance and before such a crisis.
We would be the last people to question the importance of Israel’s American connection. Like most Americans, we are proud of our country’s track record of supporting Israel. Yet it is not fanciful to raise the question of what might happen in, for example, 20 years’ time if the U.S. were embroiled in a conflict in the Pacific and then also faced with a Middle East conflict, one in which protecting Israel could expose us to terrorist attacks in the American homeland. Even if we agree that Americans see themselves as defenders of Israel (for reasons of history, faith, and cultural values), it is hard to see why Israel should rely exclusively on America’s assurance forever. Few states in history have relied upon a single alliance and an informal one at that. Most have sought to construct a web of interlocking relationships as a strategic insurance policy. It seems only prudent for Israel to seek a multilateral complement to a strong bilateral relationship.
This list of potential benefits should be matched by what some Israelis could view as the possible downsides or “costs” of such a move. One set of concerns centers on Israel’s deeply rooted belief in the need for political and strategic self-reliance and its reluctance to rely on allies. Related to this is Israel’s own negative history with and distrust of multilateral institutions, especially the United Nations. Israel will think hard about whether closer relations with the eu and nato could constrain its freedom of maneuver on core issues central to its security.
A second set of concerns has to do with Israel’s own identity and its relationship with Europe. The question of national identity is a vast subject. Suffice it to mention several key issues: Do Israelis today see themselves as a democratic Jewish state whose values are fundamentally the same as those of the Euro-Atlantic community? Or do they view themselves as a people essentially betrayed by Europe? If the answer is the former, then there is no reason why Israel should not seek a close relationship with and perhaps even inclusion in those institutions created to defend and sustain those values. If the answer is the latter, however, it is hard to see why Israelis would see a strategy of returning Israel to European institutions as desirable.
As Americans, we sympathize with feelings of Israeli exceptionalism. Yet, as Euro-Atlanticists, it strikes us as a bit odd to argue that in terms of value Israel is so distinct that it cannot fit in the broader Euro-Atlantic community, while Erdogan’s Turkey can and does. It also strikes us as curious that Israel sees itself as a close American ally yet at times is nervous about developing close relationships with other close American allies. The reason is clear: Israel’s political relations with the United States are excellent, but with Europe they are troubled. Many Israelis today doubt Europe’s commitment to Israel and are concerned about growing anti-Semitic currents on the continent. Israelis fear that closer ties with Europe will generate greater pressure for a peace settlement on unfavorable terms. These issues and fears in Israel need to be faced and resolved, something that will happen only in a real dialogue with Europe.
A third and final set of doubts has to do with the viability and cohesion of the Euro-Atlantic community itself. After all, why should Israel make a major move to get close to the Euro-Atlantic community if that community itself is in danger of falling apart? Are Americans and Europeans capable of overcoming the divisions of recent years and will they undertake this kind of strategy? Even if the Euro-Atlantic community regains its footing and comes back together again, many Israelis would ask whether such an upgrade in Israel’s relations with the West is really on offer.
Many of these concerns are real and need to be discussed and addressed at length. Even this brief survey suggests that there is a compelling case for Israelis to explore the option of such an upgrade and its potential benefits and downsides. But such a cost-benefit analysis also requires us to look at American and European interests and views.
What about the U.S.?
As the main supporter of Israel, the United States shares many of the interests and benefits listed above. This is a case where the interests of both sides potentially dovetail, as Washington clearly would benefit from a strategy that would make Israel more secure and that would enhance its long-term viability as a country and nation. In addition, the following considerations should be taken into account:
First, the U.S. would acquire partners and assistance in sharing the burden of helping to secure Israel and anchor her to the West. To be sure, Europe, by assuming more burden and responsibility, would also gain more potential influence. But it is unlikely to displace the United States as the senior partner and friend of Israel in any meaningful way barring some radical crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. Americans can afford to be relaxed. There is no danger of American influence with Israel being marginalized.
Second, the transatlantic rift over how to deal with Israel would presumably be narrowed significantly if not overcome, thus eliminating one of the current sources of tension in U.S.-European relations. One way to help narrow the gap between the United States and Europe is to force both sides to work together in developing a more common approach. It is noteworthy how deep differences often suddenly narrow when one has to share responsibility and contemplate joint action.
Third, a common Euro-Atlantic policy toward Israel would also mean that the Arab world would be less able to play on differences between the United States and Europe. Over time, this could increase the U.S. negotiating leverage and position in the Arab world.
To be sure, there will be Euro-skeptical voices in the United States who will question such an approach. They will argue that ensuring Israel’s security through a bilateral relationship with the United States is easier, more flexible, and perhaps even advantageous. They would claim that the United States would be making a mistake by “allowing” Europeans to acquire a more important voice and greater influence in Israel and in the Middle East. Yet how can we assert that Israel is part of the “West” but also insist that developing Israel’s ties with the core institutions of the West is somehow too hard or complicated? At the end of the day, if Israel makes it clear that it desires a closer relationship with Europe, then such voices are likely to be muted and limited in their impact.
As Americans, we discuss U.S. policy toward Israel frequently with our friends and colleagues. In our view, it is clear that the opening of Euro-Atlantic institutions to Israel would help resolve the moral and strategic contradictions that chafe within U.S. policy. For example, the U.S. proposes to launch the greatest democracy program for the wider Middle East ever conceived but cannot define the role of a democratic Israel in that program. nato has upgraded a “26 plus 1” relationship with Russia because Moscow can assist the West on terror and proliferation, but not with Israel in spite of its obvious potential contribution in these areas. Americans are overwhelmingly convinced that Turkey is an integral member of the Euro-Atlantic community but unsure or vague about whether Israel is or should be. We believe that U.S. policymakers should welcome a closer Israeli relationship with key Euro-Atlantic institutions and that such a step would help resolve these contradictions.
A good deal of political legwork would undoubtedly be required on the American side as well to make this official U.S. policy. Yet, arguably, the United States would have the fewest problems adopting such a strategy. It will not be the obstacle if Israel wants to move forward.
And what about Europe?
he real question lies in Europe and in European attitudes. In many ways, this is the key issue, since Europeans not only run the eu and have a decisive voice in nato as well, but also have a more troubled relationship with Israel. Yet here, too, there are arguably several ways in which Europe could benefit from such an upgrade:
First, if such an upgrade was part and parcel of a move toward peace in the Middle East, the eu would move from the sidelines to center stage in the peace process and Middle Eastern politics more generally. If Europeans truly believe that achieving Middle East peace is critical, this is one way in which they can contribute to this goal. It could acquire the kind of major role many European leaders have long aspired to have — and give an enormous boost to European diplomatic credibility and standing in the region and beyond.
Second, Europe’s own strained relationship with Israel could be mended. The current situation, in which the eu has extremely close economic and other ties with Israel but almost no meaningful political or strategic dialogue, could be overcome. A Europe that is more engaged on the ground is also likely to be a more responsible one, including in Israeli eyes.
Third, obviously some in Europe may fear that such a move would mean abandoning Europe’s policy of being “even-handed” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and undercut Europe’s standing in the Arab world. One should question whether that needs to be the case. If handled correctly, such a step might actually lead pro-Western moderate Arab states to seek their own closer ties with the Euro-Atlantic community as well, something we should welcome.
There are three big questions about the feasibility of Europeans making such a leap of strategic imagination to embrace such a bold strategy. The first is whether European leaders have the vision and courage to take such a step and whether it is domestically sustainable given the kind of critical sentiments toward Israel one finds today in many parts of Europe. As we have debated this issue over the last year, the initial response of many European colleagues has been that Israel and Palestine must first make peace, and then and only then should we discuss bringing Israel closer to and perhaps into our Euro-Atlantic institutions. We would suggest Europeans need to move beyond this static and reactive approach, flip or reverse this logic, and think in terms of what they and we can do and offer in advance of or parallel to moves toward peace in order to reinforce that process. Indeed, it is only by thinking in these more dynamic terms that Europe can acquire the sort of role and influence it wants.
The second and perhaps equally important question for many Europeans will be whether Europe can find a way to upgrade its relations with Israel yet sustain what it views as its special commitment to the Palestinians as well as to key Arab states. As mentioned earlier, it would be simplistic to assume that such a move would automatically lead to deterioration in Europe’s relations with the Arab world. Indeed, if handled properly, one could argue that such a move would enhance Europe’s prestige and influence in the Arab world. But this underscores that European countries will be more comfortable in upgrading Israel’s relations with Europe if that step can be embedded in a broader regional approach that also contains opportunities to step up outreach to key Arab states. This is a question of packaging.
Finally, there is the question of whether the eu will be willing to assume the kind of added responsibility such a strategic shift would entail — and whether it would be willing to do so in partnership with the United States. Many Europeans could be concerned that they are being drawn into potential conflicts and assuming new risk in the region. Yet at the end of the day, it may be far easier for Europe to mend its relations with Israel in a trans-Atlantic framework. Many Europeans are also aware that the problematic relationship between Israel and Europe also creates a long-term strain on U.S.-European relations, which manifests itself in doubt about the reliability of the U.S.-European partnership in the Middle East. Establishing a better Israeli-European relationship would not only serve to enhance Israeli’s security, but also mitigate those doubts.
Where to start
or the reasons laid out above, we believe there is a compelling strategic argument why Israel should explore the option of building closer ties to the Euro-Atlantic community. As noted, we are living in a moment of strategic fluidity — both across the Atlantic and in the Middle East. The future contours of the Euro-Atlantic community are likely to settle in the years ahead. The question is whether they will come to an end on the northern edge of the wider Middle East and stop with Turkey and the Black Sea region — or whether they will reach down to embrace a democratic country like Israel as well. In the Middle East itself, we may be entering a new phase of strategic fluidity as well — in connection with Prime Minister Sharon’s disengagement plan for Gaza, the election of a new Palestinian leadership, and in the region more broadly.
For all these reasons, this is the right moment for Israel to decide whether it wants to pursue a Euro-Atlantic upgrade. Both Europe and Israel need to participate equally with the United States in such a rethinking. Movement will be required on both the European and Israeli sides to make progress. As a first step, it is nevertheless Israel that needs to decide that it wants to seek a new and expanded relationship with the Euro-Atlantic community.
The instruments or tools to do so already exist. The recent Istanbul nato summit has for the first time opened the door to creating a separate bilateral Israeli-nato relationship outside of and in addition to the Mediterranean Dialogue. Israel has a friend in the current secretary general of nato, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. And the nato format would seem more manageable in political terms since the U.S. is also involved and it has a greater focus on security issues that are of immediate concern.
Israel today actually has a much closer relationship with the eu than it has with nato — arguably closer than any other non-eu member — but that relationship is non-strategic, politically stunted, and very much limited to trade, technology, and science. Yet here, too, the offer from the Essen summit of building a special relationship between the eu and Israel is still on the table. Moreover, the eu’s European Neighborhood Policy (enp) offers a broader framework within which the eu can deepen ties with both Israel and other countries in the region. The history of the past decade in terms of Euro-Atlantic outreach has shown that it is possible for the receiving country to fill initiatives like the enp with more substance than its drafters may originally have intended. From the bottom up, both the eu and nato would have to start to build a political and strategic relationship that could grow over time as well.
All long journeys start with small steps, and a strategic reorientation of the kind discussed is no different. It would require a top-down and bottom-up component. At the top there are a number of political issues — largely but not exclusively between Israel and Europe — that would have to be resolved and would undoubtedly take time. Progress toward a peace settlement with the Palestinians and clarity on Israel’s final borders undoubtedly are at the top of that list.
The scope of what is imaginable or possible is wide. It will depend upon the interest of the nato nations as well as Israel. Israel can start by turning to those nato nations that it considers to be friends and that are likely to be most interested in developing this relationship. They in turn can take the lead in creating opportunities for Israel to deepen its relationship through the plethora of existing partnership mechanisms — or by working with Israel in a subgroup of nato allies. Over time, Israel might aspire to develop the kind of close partnership relationship that countries like Sweden or Finland have developed over the past decade and enjoy today — a very close political relationship, close military interoperability, and the de facto yet unspoken option to join if the strategic environment ever makes such a move necessary.
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Note
1 A point on language: In this essay we use words like “upgrading” Israel’s relations with the Euro-Atlantic community or “anchoring” Israel to the West. These words include a spectrum of relationships ranging from closer ties up to and including possible membership. We reserve judgment at this stage on the exact form such an upgraded relationship would or should take. What we are talking about is the creation of a new and much closer relationship in which Israel both sees itself as part of the West and aspires to have the closest possible relationship with the Euro-Atlantic community — and one in which the United States and Europe think of and include Israel as a close partner and what might be termed a member of the Euro-Atlantic community’s extended family.
A Day to Remember
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
February 3, 2005
in «The New York Times»
As someone who believed, hoped, worried, prayed, worried, hoped and prayed some more that Iraqis could one day pull off the election they did, I am unreservedly happy about the outcome - and you should be, too.
Why? Because what threatens America most from the Middle East are the pathologies of a region where there is too little freedom and too many young people who aren't able to achieve their full potential. The only way to cure these pathologies is with a war of ideas within the Arab-Muslim world so those with bad ideas can be defeated by those with progressive ones.
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We can't fight that war. Only the Arab progressives can - only they can tell the suicide bombers that what they are doing is shameful to Islam and to Arabs. But we can collaborate with them to create a space in the heart of their world where decent people have a chance to fight this war - and that is what American and British soldiers have been doing in Iraq.
President Bush's basic gut instinct about the need to do this is exactly right. His thinking that this could be done on the cheap, though, with little postwar planning, was exactly wrong. Partly as a result, this great moment has already cost America over $100 billion and 10,000 killed and wounded.
That is not sustainable because the road ahead in Iraq is still long. We have to proceed with more wisdom and more allies. But proceed we must, and now we can at least do so with the certainty that partnering with the Iraqi people to build a decent consensual government is not crazy - it's really difficult, but not crazy.
But wait - not everyone is wearing a smiley face after the Iraqi elections, and that is good, considering who is unhappy. Let's start with the mullahs in Iran. Those who think that a Shiite-led government in Iraq is going to be the puppet of Iran's Shiite ayatollahs are so wrong. It is the ayatollahs in Iran who are terrified today. You see, the Iranian mullahs and their diplomats like to peddle the notion that they have their own form of democracy: "Islamic democracy." But this is a fraud, and the people who know best that it's a fraud are the ayatollahs and the Iranian people.
When any Iranian reform candidate who wants to run can be vetoed by unelected ayatollahs, and any Iranian newspaper can be shut by the same theocrats, that is not democracy. You can call that whatever you want, but not democracy. They don't allow bikinis at nudist colonies and they don't serve steak at vegetarian restaurants, and theocrats don't veto candidates in real democracies. The Iraqi Shiites just gave every Iranian Shiite next door a demonstration of what real "Islamic" democracy is: it's when Muslims vote for anyone they want. I just want to be around for Iran's next election, when the ayatollahs try to veto reform candidates and Iranian Shiites ask, Why can't we vote for anyone, like Iraqi Shiites did? Oh, boy, that's going to be pay-per-view.
Then there is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. This Charles-Manson-with-a-turban who heads the insurgency in Iraq had a bad hair day on Sunday. I wonder whether anyone told him about the suicide bomber who managed to blow up only himself outside a Baghdad polling station and how Iraqi voters walked around his body, spitting on it as they went by. Zarqawi claims to be the leader of the Iraqi Vietcong - the authentic carrier of Iraqis' national aspirations and desire to liberate their country from "U.S. occupation." In truth, he is the leader of the Iraqi Khmer Rouge - a murderous death cult.
The election has exposed this. Because the Iraqi people have now made it clear that they are the authentic carriers of their national aspirations, and while, yes, they want an end to the U.S. presence, they want that end to happen in an orderly manner and in tandem with an Iraqi constitutional process.
In other words, this election has made it crystal clear that the Iraq war is not between fascist insurgents and America, but between the fascist insurgents and the Iraqi people. One hopes the French and Germans, whose newspapers often sound more like Al Jazeera than Al Jazeera, will wake up to this fact and throw their weight onto the right side of history.
It's about time, because whatever you thought about this war, it's not about Mr. Bush any more. It's about the aspirations of the Iraqi majority to build an alternative to Saddamism. By voting the way they did, in the face of real danger, Iraqis have earned the right to ask everyone now to put aside their squabbles and focus on what is no longer just a pipe dream but a real opportunity to implant decent, consensual government in the heart of the Arab-Muslim world.
in «The New York Times»
As someone who believed, hoped, worried, prayed, worried, hoped and prayed some more that Iraqis could one day pull off the election they did, I am unreservedly happy about the outcome - and you should be, too.
Why? Because what threatens America most from the Middle East are the pathologies of a region where there is too little freedom and too many young people who aren't able to achieve their full potential. The only way to cure these pathologies is with a war of ideas within the Arab-Muslim world so those with bad ideas can be defeated by those with progressive ones.
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We can't fight that war. Only the Arab progressives can - only they can tell the suicide bombers that what they are doing is shameful to Islam and to Arabs. But we can collaborate with them to create a space in the heart of their world where decent people have a chance to fight this war - and that is what American and British soldiers have been doing in Iraq.
President Bush's basic gut instinct about the need to do this is exactly right. His thinking that this could be done on the cheap, though, with little postwar planning, was exactly wrong. Partly as a result, this great moment has already cost America over $100 billion and 10,000 killed and wounded.
That is not sustainable because the road ahead in Iraq is still long. We have to proceed with more wisdom and more allies. But proceed we must, and now we can at least do so with the certainty that partnering with the Iraqi people to build a decent consensual government is not crazy - it's really difficult, but not crazy.
But wait - not everyone is wearing a smiley face after the Iraqi elections, and that is good, considering who is unhappy. Let's start with the mullahs in Iran. Those who think that a Shiite-led government in Iraq is going to be the puppet of Iran's Shiite ayatollahs are so wrong. It is the ayatollahs in Iran who are terrified today. You see, the Iranian mullahs and their diplomats like to peddle the notion that they have their own form of democracy: "Islamic democracy." But this is a fraud, and the people who know best that it's a fraud are the ayatollahs and the Iranian people.
When any Iranian reform candidate who wants to run can be vetoed by unelected ayatollahs, and any Iranian newspaper can be shut by the same theocrats, that is not democracy. You can call that whatever you want, but not democracy. They don't allow bikinis at nudist colonies and they don't serve steak at vegetarian restaurants, and theocrats don't veto candidates in real democracies. The Iraqi Shiites just gave every Iranian Shiite next door a demonstration of what real "Islamic" democracy is: it's when Muslims vote for anyone they want. I just want to be around for Iran's next election, when the ayatollahs try to veto reform candidates and Iranian Shiites ask, Why can't we vote for anyone, like Iraqi Shiites did? Oh, boy, that's going to be pay-per-view.
Then there is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. This Charles-Manson-with-a-turban who heads the insurgency in Iraq had a bad hair day on Sunday. I wonder whether anyone told him about the suicide bomber who managed to blow up only himself outside a Baghdad polling station and how Iraqi voters walked around his body, spitting on it as they went by. Zarqawi claims to be the leader of the Iraqi Vietcong - the authentic carrier of Iraqis' national aspirations and desire to liberate their country from "U.S. occupation." In truth, he is the leader of the Iraqi Khmer Rouge - a murderous death cult.
The election has exposed this. Because the Iraqi people have now made it clear that they are the authentic carriers of their national aspirations, and while, yes, they want an end to the U.S. presence, they want that end to happen in an orderly manner and in tandem with an Iraqi constitutional process.
In other words, this election has made it crystal clear that the Iraq war is not between fascist insurgents and America, but between the fascist insurgents and the Iraqi people. One hopes the French and Germans, whose newspapers often sound more like Al Jazeera than Al Jazeera, will wake up to this fact and throw their weight onto the right side of history.
It's about time, because whatever you thought about this war, it's not about Mr. Bush any more. It's about the aspirations of the Iraqi majority to build an alternative to Saddamism. By voting the way they did, in the face of real danger, Iraqis have earned the right to ask everyone now to put aside their squabbles and focus on what is no longer just a pipe dream but a real opportunity to implant decent, consensual government in the heart of the Arab-Muslim world.
George Bush Talks Big, and He Delivers
by Max Boot
February 3, 2005
in «LA TIMES»
No, the insurgency isn't over. No, U.S. troops can't come home yet. No, one election does not a democracy make. No, paradise has not dawned in Mesopotamia. Every caveat offered by the cautious is true. Yet even days later, all I can say is … wow!
For those of us who supported President Bush's decision to liberate Iraq — and who, unlike some fair-weather friends, never wavered in our conviction that it was the right thing to do — there hasn't been a lot of good news to celebrate since the capture of Saddam Hussein. And that was more than a year ago.
So you will forgive me if I savor Monday's headlines: "Iraqi Turnout Trumps Violence"; "Security Effort Holds Insurgents Mostly at Bay"; "President Hails Election as a Success and a Signal." Even more eloquent were the ubiquitous pictures of Iraqis giving terrorists the finger — literally — as they exhibited ink-stained index fingers showing they had voted.
I am not a weeper, but as I watched television coverage of the voting I found myself on the verge of tears. Tears of relief and jubilation and astonishment. The spectacle of millions of Iraqis braving bombs and bullets to cast ballots was awe-inspiring and humbling. It made me feel slightly ashamed about my own attitude toward voting. I, like many other citizens of well- established democracies, tend to view it as a chore, like taking out the garbage. Iraqis do not have the luxury of taking democracy for granted. They were dying to vote — and some in fact died in the act. But others stepped up into the voting booth anyway.
It was almost enough to make a hardened cynic think that indeed "the call of freedom comes to every mind and every soul." Those words are from President Bush's much-mocked inaugural address, which struck even some of the president's supporters as too preachy and too utopian. Yet Bush doesn't simply talk big. He delivers, notwithstanding the nonstop naysaying of most of the nation's allies and our own foreign policy establishment.
Who, four years ago, would have dreamed that Afghans and Iraqis by the millions would take part in free and fair elections? That it has happened is primarily because of the men and women of those countries who have made clear their desire to cast off despotism, and because of the men and women of the coalition armed forces who have paid a heavy price to defeat terrorists and tyrants. But it's also a tribute to Bush, who has never wavered from his belief that the forces of civilization will prevail.
The president's critics have counseled him to scale back his ambitious goals, to postpone elections, to make a deal with the enemies of freedom. They have sneered at his "mindless determination" and claimed that he had embroiled the United States in a "quagmire" and a "catastrophic failure" — as Ted Kennedy did just three days before the Iraq election. They have wondered why he didn't give a speech calling his foreign policy one big miscalculation. Above all, they have scoffed at his unshakeable conviction that Afghans and Arabs could live as freely as Iowans or Italians.
His vision, admittedly, is a long way from being fully realized, but it has taken a giant step closer to reality with the successful elections in Iraq and Afghanistan.
To a lesser degree, the recent Palestinian Authority election also redounds to his credit. In 2002, Bush broke with foreign policy orthodoxy by announcing he would not negotiate with the Palestinians until they had taken firm steps toward democracy. All the experts predicted disaster. What we got instead was a pledge from the Israeli prime minister to pull out of the Gaza Strip and a pledge from the new Palestinian president to crack down on terrorism.
Much can still go wrong in the broader Middle East. Indeed, much has gone wrong already. There is no doubt that Bush has made plenty of mistakes.
The mistake he has not made, however, is the most important of all: He has not lost his nerve.
History shows that a mighty nation can recover from wartime miscalculations. It can bounce back from defeats at Bull Run or Bataan, Chancellorsville or the Choisin Reservoir, as long as it possesses a leader who never acknowledges that he is beaten.
In George W. Bush we have such a man. His stubbornness and certitude can annoy even his friends, but they are precisely the qualities needed in a wartime leader. They are the qualities that have made possible the edifying spectacle of Iraqis rising up to rule themselves.
February 3, 2005
in «LA TIMES»
No, the insurgency isn't over. No, U.S. troops can't come home yet. No, one election does not a democracy make. No, paradise has not dawned in Mesopotamia. Every caveat offered by the cautious is true. Yet even days later, all I can say is … wow!
For those of us who supported President Bush's decision to liberate Iraq — and who, unlike some fair-weather friends, never wavered in our conviction that it was the right thing to do — there hasn't been a lot of good news to celebrate since the capture of Saddam Hussein. And that was more than a year ago.
So you will forgive me if I savor Monday's headlines: "Iraqi Turnout Trumps Violence"; "Security Effort Holds Insurgents Mostly at Bay"; "President Hails Election as a Success and a Signal." Even more eloquent were the ubiquitous pictures of Iraqis giving terrorists the finger — literally — as they exhibited ink-stained index fingers showing they had voted.
I am not a weeper, but as I watched television coverage of the voting I found myself on the verge of tears. Tears of relief and jubilation and astonishment. The spectacle of millions of Iraqis braving bombs and bullets to cast ballots was awe-inspiring and humbling. It made me feel slightly ashamed about my own attitude toward voting. I, like many other citizens of well- established democracies, tend to view it as a chore, like taking out the garbage. Iraqis do not have the luxury of taking democracy for granted. They were dying to vote — and some in fact died in the act. But others stepped up into the voting booth anyway.
It was almost enough to make a hardened cynic think that indeed "the call of freedom comes to every mind and every soul." Those words are from President Bush's much-mocked inaugural address, which struck even some of the president's supporters as too preachy and too utopian. Yet Bush doesn't simply talk big. He delivers, notwithstanding the nonstop naysaying of most of the nation's allies and our own foreign policy establishment.
Who, four years ago, would have dreamed that Afghans and Iraqis by the millions would take part in free and fair elections? That it has happened is primarily because of the men and women of those countries who have made clear their desire to cast off despotism, and because of the men and women of the coalition armed forces who have paid a heavy price to defeat terrorists and tyrants. But it's also a tribute to Bush, who has never wavered from his belief that the forces of civilization will prevail.
The president's critics have counseled him to scale back his ambitious goals, to postpone elections, to make a deal with the enemies of freedom. They have sneered at his "mindless determination" and claimed that he had embroiled the United States in a "quagmire" and a "catastrophic failure" — as Ted Kennedy did just three days before the Iraq election. They have wondered why he didn't give a speech calling his foreign policy one big miscalculation. Above all, they have scoffed at his unshakeable conviction that Afghans and Arabs could live as freely as Iowans or Italians.
His vision, admittedly, is a long way from being fully realized, but it has taken a giant step closer to reality with the successful elections in Iraq and Afghanistan.
To a lesser degree, the recent Palestinian Authority election also redounds to his credit. In 2002, Bush broke with foreign policy orthodoxy by announcing he would not negotiate with the Palestinians until they had taken firm steps toward democracy. All the experts predicted disaster. What we got instead was a pledge from the Israeli prime minister to pull out of the Gaza Strip and a pledge from the new Palestinian president to crack down on terrorism.
Much can still go wrong in the broader Middle East. Indeed, much has gone wrong already. There is no doubt that Bush has made plenty of mistakes.
The mistake he has not made, however, is the most important of all: He has not lost his nerve.
History shows that a mighty nation can recover from wartime miscalculations. It can bounce back from defeats at Bull Run or Bataan, Chancellorsville or the Choisin Reservoir, as long as it possesses a leader who never acknowledges that he is beaten.
In George W. Bush we have such a man. His stubbornness and certitude can annoy even his friends, but they are precisely the qualities needed in a wartime leader. They are the qualities that have made possible the edifying spectacle of Iraqis rising up to rule themselves.
2.01.2005
Apaziguamento Revisitado
Por VACLAV HAVEL
Domingo, 30 de Janeiro de 2005
in «PÚBLICO»
Lembro-me como se fosse hoje das situações difíceis, às vezes um pouco grotescas, arriscada e constrangedoras nas quais se viam envolvidos os diplomatas ocidentais durante a guerra-fria. Deparavam-se regularmente com a questão delicada de saber se deviam ou não convidar para as respectivas embaixadas subscritores da Carta 77, activistas dos direitos humanos, críticos do regime comunista, políticos afastados ou mesmo escritores banidos, académicos e jornalistas - gente de quem normalmente os diplomatas são amigos.
Às vezes, nós, os dissidentes, não éramos convidados mas recebíamos as devidas desculpas; outras, recebíamos convite mas não íamos para não complicar a situação dos nossos corajosos amigos diplomatas. Ou então éramos convidados para chegar mais cedo, na esperança de que já tivéssemos saído antes de chegarem os representantes oficiais, o que por vezes resultava, outras nem por isso. Nestas ocasiões, ou os representantes oficiais abandonavam a embaixada em protesto pela nossa presença, ou saíamos nós à pressa, ou fingíamos todos que não percebíamos nada do que se estava a passar, ou até - ainda que raramente - chegávamos à fala uns com os outros, nos únicos momentos de diálogo entre o regime e a oposição, descontando os nossos encontros no tribunal.
Tudo isto acontecia quando a Cortina de Ferro dividia a Europa - e o mundo - em campos opostos. Os diplomatas ocidentais tinham de levar em consideração os interesses económicos dos seus países. Mas, ao contrário do lado soviético, levavam muito a sério a ideia da "dissidência versus comércio". Não me consigo lembrar de nenhuma ocasião em que o Ocidente ou qualquer das suas organizações (NATO, Comunidade Europeia, etc.) tivessem lançado qualquer apelo público recomendação ou declaração dizendo que um qualquer grupo de pessoas de espírito livre - mesmo que delimitado - não devesse ser convidado para as festas, celebrações ou recepções diplomáticas.
E no entanto é a isto que hoje estamos a assistir. Uma das mais fortes e mais poderosas instituições do mundo - a União Europeia - não hesita em prometer publicamente à ditadura cubana que reinstalará o "apartheid" diplomático. As embaixadas da UE em Havana passarão a seleccionar as suas listas de convidados de acordo com os desejos do governo de Cuba. As vistas curtas do primeiro-ministro José Zapatero de Espanha acabaram por prevalecer.
Tentemos imaginar o que vai acontecer: em cada embaixada europeia, há-de haver alguém encarregado de escrutinar a lista de convidados, nome a nome, e avaliar até que ponto as pessoas consideradas se comportam livremente ou falam livremente em público, até que ponto são críticos do regime, ou mesmo se são antigos presos políticos. As listas serão reduzidas e alguns nomes serão apagados, mesmo que isto signifique a eliminação de alguns amigos pessoais dos diplomatas responsáveis pelo escrutínio, pessoas a quem já prestaram diversas formas de apoio intelectual, político e material. Será ainda pior se os países da União tentarem disfarçar as suas actividades discriminatórias, passando a convidar para as suas embaixadas apenas pessoal diplomático.
Não consigo imaginar uma forma melhor de a União desonrar os nobres ideais da liberdade, igualdade e dos direitos humanos que professa - os mesmos princípios que volta a reafirmar na sua Constituição. Para proteger os lucros das empresas europeias em Havana, a União deixará de convidar pessoas de espírito livre para as suas embaixadas, apagando os seus nomes perante um cenho franzido na face do ditador e dos seus associados. É difícil de imaginar um acordo mais vergonhoso.
Os dissidentes cubanos viverão bem sem as festas e a conversa fácil das recepções das embaixadas. Esta perseguição poderá talvez agravar as condições do seu combate, mas vão certamente sobreviver. A questão é saber se o Ocidente também sobreviverá.
Hoje, a União está a dançar ao som da música de Fidel. O que quer dizer que, amanhã, pode não resistir à oportunidade de construir bases de mísseis nas costas da república Popular da China. No dia seguinte, pode permitir que as suas decisões sobre a Tchetchénia sejam ditadas pelos conselheiros do Presidente Vladimir Putin. Depois, por qualquer razão desconhecida, pode fazer depender a sua assistência a África dos laços fraternos com os piores ditadores africanos.
Onde é que tudo isto acabará? Na libertação de Milosevic? Na recusa de um visto ao activista dos direitos humanos russo Sergey Kovaliov? Num pedido de desculpas a Saddam Hussein? Na abertura de conversações de paz com a Al Qaeda?
Será terrível para a União se decidir recuperar um das suas piores tradições políticas, a de que o mal deve ser apaziguado e que a melhor maneira de conseguir a paz é através da indiferença perante a liberdade dos outros. O contrário é que é verdadeiro: estas políticas resultam da indiferença perante a nossa própria liberdade e abrem o caminho à guerra. Apesar de tudo, a Europa uniu-se para defender a sua liberdade e os seus valores, não para sacrificá-los à ideia de coexistência harmoniosas com ditadores e, por isso, arrisca-se a ser gradualmente infiltrada pelo vírus anti-democrático.
Acredito firmemente que os novos membros da União Europeia não esquecerão a sua experiência de totalitarismo e de oposição pacífica ao mal, e que a sua experiência acabe por reflectir-se no seu comportamento nas instituições europeias. Este será, sem qualquer dúvida, o melhor contributo que podem dar aos fundamentos morais, espirituais e políticos que unem a Europa.
Domingo, 30 de Janeiro de 2005
in «PÚBLICO»
Lembro-me como se fosse hoje das situações difíceis, às vezes um pouco grotescas, arriscada e constrangedoras nas quais se viam envolvidos os diplomatas ocidentais durante a guerra-fria. Deparavam-se regularmente com a questão delicada de saber se deviam ou não convidar para as respectivas embaixadas subscritores da Carta 77, activistas dos direitos humanos, críticos do regime comunista, políticos afastados ou mesmo escritores banidos, académicos e jornalistas - gente de quem normalmente os diplomatas são amigos.
Às vezes, nós, os dissidentes, não éramos convidados mas recebíamos as devidas desculpas; outras, recebíamos convite mas não íamos para não complicar a situação dos nossos corajosos amigos diplomatas. Ou então éramos convidados para chegar mais cedo, na esperança de que já tivéssemos saído antes de chegarem os representantes oficiais, o que por vezes resultava, outras nem por isso. Nestas ocasiões, ou os representantes oficiais abandonavam a embaixada em protesto pela nossa presença, ou saíamos nós à pressa, ou fingíamos todos que não percebíamos nada do que se estava a passar, ou até - ainda que raramente - chegávamos à fala uns com os outros, nos únicos momentos de diálogo entre o regime e a oposição, descontando os nossos encontros no tribunal.
Tudo isto acontecia quando a Cortina de Ferro dividia a Europa - e o mundo - em campos opostos. Os diplomatas ocidentais tinham de levar em consideração os interesses económicos dos seus países. Mas, ao contrário do lado soviético, levavam muito a sério a ideia da "dissidência versus comércio". Não me consigo lembrar de nenhuma ocasião em que o Ocidente ou qualquer das suas organizações (NATO, Comunidade Europeia, etc.) tivessem lançado qualquer apelo público recomendação ou declaração dizendo que um qualquer grupo de pessoas de espírito livre - mesmo que delimitado - não devesse ser convidado para as festas, celebrações ou recepções diplomáticas.
E no entanto é a isto que hoje estamos a assistir. Uma das mais fortes e mais poderosas instituições do mundo - a União Europeia - não hesita em prometer publicamente à ditadura cubana que reinstalará o "apartheid" diplomático. As embaixadas da UE em Havana passarão a seleccionar as suas listas de convidados de acordo com os desejos do governo de Cuba. As vistas curtas do primeiro-ministro José Zapatero de Espanha acabaram por prevalecer.
Tentemos imaginar o que vai acontecer: em cada embaixada europeia, há-de haver alguém encarregado de escrutinar a lista de convidados, nome a nome, e avaliar até que ponto as pessoas consideradas se comportam livremente ou falam livremente em público, até que ponto são críticos do regime, ou mesmo se são antigos presos políticos. As listas serão reduzidas e alguns nomes serão apagados, mesmo que isto signifique a eliminação de alguns amigos pessoais dos diplomatas responsáveis pelo escrutínio, pessoas a quem já prestaram diversas formas de apoio intelectual, político e material. Será ainda pior se os países da União tentarem disfarçar as suas actividades discriminatórias, passando a convidar para as suas embaixadas apenas pessoal diplomático.
Não consigo imaginar uma forma melhor de a União desonrar os nobres ideais da liberdade, igualdade e dos direitos humanos que professa - os mesmos princípios que volta a reafirmar na sua Constituição. Para proteger os lucros das empresas europeias em Havana, a União deixará de convidar pessoas de espírito livre para as suas embaixadas, apagando os seus nomes perante um cenho franzido na face do ditador e dos seus associados. É difícil de imaginar um acordo mais vergonhoso.
Os dissidentes cubanos viverão bem sem as festas e a conversa fácil das recepções das embaixadas. Esta perseguição poderá talvez agravar as condições do seu combate, mas vão certamente sobreviver. A questão é saber se o Ocidente também sobreviverá.
Hoje, a União está a dançar ao som da música de Fidel. O que quer dizer que, amanhã, pode não resistir à oportunidade de construir bases de mísseis nas costas da república Popular da China. No dia seguinte, pode permitir que as suas decisões sobre a Tchetchénia sejam ditadas pelos conselheiros do Presidente Vladimir Putin. Depois, por qualquer razão desconhecida, pode fazer depender a sua assistência a África dos laços fraternos com os piores ditadores africanos.
Onde é que tudo isto acabará? Na libertação de Milosevic? Na recusa de um visto ao activista dos direitos humanos russo Sergey Kovaliov? Num pedido de desculpas a Saddam Hussein? Na abertura de conversações de paz com a Al Qaeda?
Será terrível para a União se decidir recuperar um das suas piores tradições políticas, a de que o mal deve ser apaziguado e que a melhor maneira de conseguir a paz é através da indiferença perante a liberdade dos outros. O contrário é que é verdadeiro: estas políticas resultam da indiferença perante a nossa própria liberdade e abrem o caminho à guerra. Apesar de tudo, a Europa uniu-se para defender a sua liberdade e os seus valores, não para sacrificá-los à ideia de coexistência harmoniosas com ditadores e, por isso, arrisca-se a ser gradualmente infiltrada pelo vírus anti-democrático.
Acredito firmemente que os novos membros da União Europeia não esquecerão a sua experiência de totalitarismo e de oposição pacífica ao mal, e que a sua experiência acabe por reflectir-se no seu comportamento nas instituições europeias. Este será, sem qualquer dúvida, o melhor contributo que podem dar aos fundamentos morais, espirituais e políticos que unem a Europa.
Lições de Democracia para o Mundo Árabe
Por Shlomo Avineri - professor de Ciência Política na Universidade Hebraica de Jerusalém;
Exclusivo PÚBLICO/ Project Syndicate
Sábado, 29 de Janeiro de 2005
A euforia que saudou a eleição de Mahmoud Abbas para presidente da Autoridade Palestiniana talvez se justifique. Mas agora é tempo de uma apreciação clara do que se apresenta aos palestinianos, aos israelitas e, talvez de forma mais importante, ao mundo árabe em geral.
Tal apreciação requer o reconhecimento de que a eleição não foi sem falhas: o Hamas e a Jihad Islâmica boicotaram as eleições e Marwan Barghouti, membro da Fatah tal como Abbas e o candidato que poderia gravemente desafiá-lo, foi persuadido pela liderança do movimento a retirar a sua candidatura, de forma a apresentar uma frente unida. Além disso, Abbas (também conhecido por Abu Mazen) conseguiu colocar sob seu controlo uma dezena de serviços e milícias de segurança palestinianos. Isto garantiu a sua vitória, se bem que os desfiles de homens armados a agitar armas nos seus comícios não seja exactamente o que as normas democráticas prevêem.
No entanto, permanece o facto de que, depois de décadas de liderança autocrática de Yasser Arafat, e apesar dos constrangimentos óbvios da contínua ocupação israelita, os palestinianos elegeram um presidente numa eleição relativamente livre e competitiva. Durante anos, Arafat evitou efectuar eleições, tal como requerido pelas leis da Autoridade Palestiniana, sob o pretexto de que não se poderiam efectuar sob ocupação: mas, dois meses depois da sua morte, houve eleições, com grande êxito.
As presidenciais vão obviamente servir como catalisador para negociações renovadas - e possivelmente com mais êxito - com Israel. Mas o impacto do voto palestiniano também será observado atentamente no mundo árabe, porque o que aconteceu na Cisjordânia e na Faixa de Gaza não tem paralelo nos anais da política árabe. Abbas beneficiará do facto de ter sido eleito. Nada como isto tinha acontecido em qualquer país árabe. Abbas é agora o único líder árabe que chegou ao poder numa eleição mais ou menos livre.
Será a sociedade palestiniana tão diferente de outras sociedades árabes? Não verdadeiramente. Mas houve alguns factores únicos no contexto palestiniano. Primeiro, houve forte pressão externa: confrontados e exasperados com o estilo autocrático de Arafat, os EUA e a União Europeia disseram claramente aos palestinianos que qualquer futuro apoio para a sua demanda da independência dependeria de terem um processo democrático razoavelmente aceitável.
Em segundo lugar, a maior parte dos palestinianos entendeu que a sua capacidade de atravessar tal processo democrático era em si um significativo passo na sua luta contra Israel. Finalmente, os palestinianos têm sido expostos não só às agruras da ocupação israelita (...) como também puderam experimentar uma democracia liberal em funcionamento - uma imprensa livre, um poder judicial independente e pluralismo político. A dialética da ocupação desempenha estranhos jogos, tanto com o ocupante como com o ocupado.
As eleições palestinianas foram vistas em todo o mundo árabe na Al-Jazira e em outros canais árabes. Devem ter focado a mente das pessoas na sua própria situação política. Se os palestinianos, sob ocupação israelita, podem escolher os seus próprios líderes, por que é que o mesmo não poderá acontecer no Cairo ou em Damasco, em Riad ou Argel?
Quando o júbilo e os cumprimentos aos palestinianos diminuírem, tanto os governantes como as massas árabes poderão começar a fazer algumas perguntas difíceis. Os palestinianos demonstraram não ser verdade que uma sociedade árabe não possa progredir para instituições representativas. Portanto, por que é que este progresso não poderá ser seguido em outras sociedades árabes?
Talvez uma bomba-relógio tenha sido colocada sob os tronos dos potentados árabes - reis, emires e presidentes. Enquanto o Iraque - uma tentativa de importar a democracia pela força - está a falhar, as condições paradoxais de uma democracia árabe sob ocupação israelita poderão ser uma ameaça que os dirigentes árabes ainda não compreenderam.
Sábado, 29 de Janeiro de 2005
A euforia que saudou a eleição de Mahmoud Abbas para presidente da Autoridade Palestiniana talvez se justifique. Mas agora é tempo de uma apreciação clara do que se apresenta aos palestinianos, aos israelitas e, talvez de forma mais importante, ao mundo árabe em geral.
Tal apreciação requer o reconhecimento de que a eleição não foi sem falhas: o Hamas e a Jihad Islâmica boicotaram as eleições e Marwan Barghouti, membro da Fatah tal como Abbas e o candidato que poderia gravemente desafiá-lo, foi persuadido pela liderança do movimento a retirar a sua candidatura, de forma a apresentar uma frente unida. Além disso, Abbas (também conhecido por Abu Mazen) conseguiu colocar sob seu controlo uma dezena de serviços e milícias de segurança palestinianos. Isto garantiu a sua vitória, se bem que os desfiles de homens armados a agitar armas nos seus comícios não seja exactamente o que as normas democráticas prevêem.
No entanto, permanece o facto de que, depois de décadas de liderança autocrática de Yasser Arafat, e apesar dos constrangimentos óbvios da contínua ocupação israelita, os palestinianos elegeram um presidente numa eleição relativamente livre e competitiva. Durante anos, Arafat evitou efectuar eleições, tal como requerido pelas leis da Autoridade Palestiniana, sob o pretexto de que não se poderiam efectuar sob ocupação: mas, dois meses depois da sua morte, houve eleições, com grande êxito.
As presidenciais vão obviamente servir como catalisador para negociações renovadas - e possivelmente com mais êxito - com Israel. Mas o impacto do voto palestiniano também será observado atentamente no mundo árabe, porque o que aconteceu na Cisjordânia e na Faixa de Gaza não tem paralelo nos anais da política árabe. Abbas beneficiará do facto de ter sido eleito. Nada como isto tinha acontecido em qualquer país árabe. Abbas é agora o único líder árabe que chegou ao poder numa eleição mais ou menos livre.
Será a sociedade palestiniana tão diferente de outras sociedades árabes? Não verdadeiramente. Mas houve alguns factores únicos no contexto palestiniano. Primeiro, houve forte pressão externa: confrontados e exasperados com o estilo autocrático de Arafat, os EUA e a União Europeia disseram claramente aos palestinianos que qualquer futuro apoio para a sua demanda da independência dependeria de terem um processo democrático razoavelmente aceitável.
Em segundo lugar, a maior parte dos palestinianos entendeu que a sua capacidade de atravessar tal processo democrático era em si um significativo passo na sua luta contra Israel. Finalmente, os palestinianos têm sido expostos não só às agruras da ocupação israelita (...) como também puderam experimentar uma democracia liberal em funcionamento - uma imprensa livre, um poder judicial independente e pluralismo político. A dialética da ocupação desempenha estranhos jogos, tanto com o ocupante como com o ocupado.
As eleições palestinianas foram vistas em todo o mundo árabe na Al-Jazira e em outros canais árabes. Devem ter focado a mente das pessoas na sua própria situação política. Se os palestinianos, sob ocupação israelita, podem escolher os seus próprios líderes, por que é que o mesmo não poderá acontecer no Cairo ou em Damasco, em Riad ou Argel?
Quando o júbilo e os cumprimentos aos palestinianos diminuírem, tanto os governantes como as massas árabes poderão começar a fazer algumas perguntas difíceis. Os palestinianos demonstraram não ser verdade que uma sociedade árabe não possa progredir para instituições representativas. Portanto, por que é que este progresso não poderá ser seguido em outras sociedades árabes?
Talvez uma bomba-relógio tenha sido colocada sob os tronos dos potentados árabes - reis, emires e presidentes. Enquanto o Iraque - uma tentativa de importar a democracia pela força - está a falhar, as condições paradoxais de uma democracia árabe sob ocupação israelita poderão ser uma ameaça que os dirigentes árabes ainda não compreenderam.
Vendendo a América
Informação é poder e, hoje, uma maior parte do mundo tem acesso a ela
Há um ano, a então Conselheira para a Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos Condoleezza Rice, anunciou "Estamos, antes de mais, envolvidos numa guerra ideológica e não numa guerra de exércitos."
Ela estava certa, mas é uma guerra que os Estados Unidos estão a perder, porque são regularmente ultrapassados pela Al-Qaeda.
O antiamericanismo crescente em todo o mundo ameaça privar os EUA do poder de atracção de que necessitam para serem bem sucedidos na luta contra o terrorismo.
Como ficou demonstrado pelo Iraque, o poder militar puro e duro não consegue por si só fornecer uma solução.
Sondagens após sondagens confirmam que o poder de atracção da América diminuiu, particularmente no mundo islâmico. Mesmo nos países supostamente amigos como a Jordânia e o Paquistão, há mais pessoas a dizerem que confiam em Ussama Ben Laden do que em George Bush.
Informação é poder e, actualmente, uma muito maior parte do mundo tem acesso a ela. Os dias em que funcionários dos Negócios Estrangeiros dos EUA iam de jipe até regiões remotas do Terceiro Mundo para mostrarem filmes em bobinas a aldeões isolados, acabaram há muito. Os avanços tecnológicos levaram a uma explosão da informação, e o público tornou-se mais sensível à propaganda. O mundo está submergido em informação, alguma verdadeira, outra enganadora.
Em resultado disto, a política tornou-se num concurso sobre credibilidade.
Enquanto o mundo do poder político tradicional é tipicamente definido por aqueles cujo poder militar ou económico vence, a política, numa era da informação, é acerca de quem tem a história vencedora.
Os Governos competem uns com os outros e com outras organizações para melhorarem a sua própria credibilidade e enfraquecer a dos seus opositores. Infelizmente, o Governo dos EUA não acompanhou a tendência.
Até o Conselho de Ciência da Defesa do Pentágono admite isto, afirmando que a comunicação estratégica da América "tem falta de direcção presidencial, de coordenação eficaz entre as agências, de optimização da cooperação com o sector privado e de recursos adequados".
Nos últimos anos da Administração Clinton, o Congresso aboliu erradamente a Agência de Informação dos EUA e distribuiu as suas tarefas a um novo subsecretário para a Diplomacia Pública, no Departamento de Estado.
Este posto tem sido, subsequentemente, deixado vago ou, durante dois dos últimos quatro anos, preenchido apenas numa base interina.
O orçamento total para a diplomacia pública (emissão, informação e programas de intercâmbio) é de 1200 milhões de dólares, aproximadamente o mesmo de França ou do que o McDonald's gasta em publicidade.
O Governo americano gasta 450 vezes mais em poder militar do que em poder de atracção.
Em 1963, Edward R. Murrow, o famoso jornalista que dirigiu a Agência de Informação dos EUA na Administração Kennedy, definiu diplomacia pública como interacções não apenas com Governos estrangeiros, mas, principalmente, com indivíduos e organizações não-governamentais que, frequentemente, apresentavam uma variedade de pontos de vista privados além dos governamentais.
Os cépticos que tratam a "diplomacia pública" como um eufemismo para a emissão de propaganda governamental falham o objectivo. A simples propaganda carece de credibilidade e é, por isso, contraproducente. A diplomacia pública, ao contrário, envolve a construção de relações a longo prazo.
Mais importante, na actual situação, será o desenvolvimento de uma estratégia a longo prazo de trocas culturais e educacionais com o objectivo de desenvolver uma sociedade civil nos países do Médio Oriente mais rica e mais aberta.
Dada a baixa credibilidade oficial, os porta-vozes mais eficazes da América serão, muitas vezes, os não governamentais.
Alguns analistas sugeriram até que os EUA criassem uma corporação não partidária para a diplomacia pública que recebesse fundos governamentais e privados mas que estimulasse as comunicações independentes além-fronteiras.
Corporações, fundações, universidades e outras organizações não lucrativas podem promover uma grande parte do trabalho de desenvolvimento de uma sociedade civil aberta.
As empresas e fundações podem oferecer tecnologia para ajudar a modernizar os sistemas de educação árabes e levá-los além da aprendizagem rotineira.
As universidades americanas podem instituir mais programas de intercâmbio para estudantes e professores.
As fundações podem apoiar o de-senvolvimento de instituições de estudos americanos em países muçulmanos ou programas de melhoramento do profissionalismo de jornalistas. Podem apoiar o ensino do inglês e financiar intercâmbios de estudantes.
Resumindo, há muitos caminhos para uma estratégia eficaz a longo prazo para criar recursos de poder de atracção e promover as condições para o desenvolvimento da democracia.
A resposta à recente catástrofe do tsunami na Ásia é um caso concreto. O Presidente George W. Bush ofereceu - embora atrasado - 350 mil milhões de dólares para ajuda às vítimas e enviou emissários de alto nível para a região.
Houve também um apoio privado substancial da parte de organizações de caridade e não lucrativas americanas. As imagens de soldados americanos a combater no Iraque foram suplantadas por imagens da América a distribuir ajuda às vítimas da catástrofe.
Mas é essencial que haja uma continuidade eficaz. Os anúncios prévios de Bush sobre o aumento do desenvolvimento da assistência e de esforços mais notórios para combater o HIV/Sida em África não foram apenas imperativos morais mas também investimentos importantes no poder de atracção da América.
Infelizmente, os fundos necessários para implementar estas iniciativas não fluíram tão rapidamente como a retórica. Igualmente importante, nenhum destes esforços ou nenhuma diplomacia pública será eficaz a não ser que o estilo e a substância das políticas dos EUA sejam consistentes com uma mensagem democrática mais alargada.
Isto significa que a tarefa mais importante de Condoleezza Rice como secretária de Estado será dar à política externa um estilo mais consultivo enquanto procura uma solução política para o Iraque e progressos para a paz no Médio Oriente.
Só então ela será capaz de começar a tarefa de recuperação da reputação abalada da América, apoiando a sua negligenciada diplomacia pública.
Ela estava certa, mas é uma guerra que os Estados Unidos estão a perder, porque são regularmente ultrapassados pela Al-Qaeda.
O antiamericanismo crescente em todo o mundo ameaça privar os EUA do poder de atracção de que necessitam para serem bem sucedidos na luta contra o terrorismo.
Como ficou demonstrado pelo Iraque, o poder militar puro e duro não consegue por si só fornecer uma solução.
Sondagens após sondagens confirmam que o poder de atracção da América diminuiu, particularmente no mundo islâmico. Mesmo nos países supostamente amigos como a Jordânia e o Paquistão, há mais pessoas a dizerem que confiam em Ussama Ben Laden do que em George Bush.
Informação é poder e, actualmente, uma muito maior parte do mundo tem acesso a ela. Os dias em que funcionários dos Negócios Estrangeiros dos EUA iam de jipe até regiões remotas do Terceiro Mundo para mostrarem filmes em bobinas a aldeões isolados, acabaram há muito. Os avanços tecnológicos levaram a uma explosão da informação, e o público tornou-se mais sensível à propaganda. O mundo está submergido em informação, alguma verdadeira, outra enganadora.
Em resultado disto, a política tornou-se num concurso sobre credibilidade.
Enquanto o mundo do poder político tradicional é tipicamente definido por aqueles cujo poder militar ou económico vence, a política, numa era da informação, é acerca de quem tem a história vencedora.
Os Governos competem uns com os outros e com outras organizações para melhorarem a sua própria credibilidade e enfraquecer a dos seus opositores. Infelizmente, o Governo dos EUA não acompanhou a tendência.
Até o Conselho de Ciência da Defesa do Pentágono admite isto, afirmando que a comunicação estratégica da América "tem falta de direcção presidencial, de coordenação eficaz entre as agências, de optimização da cooperação com o sector privado e de recursos adequados".
Nos últimos anos da Administração Clinton, o Congresso aboliu erradamente a Agência de Informação dos EUA e distribuiu as suas tarefas a um novo subsecretário para a Diplomacia Pública, no Departamento de Estado.
Este posto tem sido, subsequentemente, deixado vago ou, durante dois dos últimos quatro anos, preenchido apenas numa base interina.
O orçamento total para a diplomacia pública (emissão, informação e programas de intercâmbio) é de 1200 milhões de dólares, aproximadamente o mesmo de França ou do que o McDonald's gasta em publicidade.
O Governo americano gasta 450 vezes mais em poder militar do que em poder de atracção.
Em 1963, Edward R. Murrow, o famoso jornalista que dirigiu a Agência de Informação dos EUA na Administração Kennedy, definiu diplomacia pública como interacções não apenas com Governos estrangeiros, mas, principalmente, com indivíduos e organizações não-governamentais que, frequentemente, apresentavam uma variedade de pontos de vista privados além dos governamentais.
Os cépticos que tratam a "diplomacia pública" como um eufemismo para a emissão de propaganda governamental falham o objectivo. A simples propaganda carece de credibilidade e é, por isso, contraproducente. A diplomacia pública, ao contrário, envolve a construção de relações a longo prazo.
Mais importante, na actual situação, será o desenvolvimento de uma estratégia a longo prazo de trocas culturais e educacionais com o objectivo de desenvolver uma sociedade civil nos países do Médio Oriente mais rica e mais aberta.
Dada a baixa credibilidade oficial, os porta-vozes mais eficazes da América serão, muitas vezes, os não governamentais.
Alguns analistas sugeriram até que os EUA criassem uma corporação não partidária para a diplomacia pública que recebesse fundos governamentais e privados mas que estimulasse as comunicações independentes além-fronteiras.
Corporações, fundações, universidades e outras organizações não lucrativas podem promover uma grande parte do trabalho de desenvolvimento de uma sociedade civil aberta.
As empresas e fundações podem oferecer tecnologia para ajudar a modernizar os sistemas de educação árabes e levá-los além da aprendizagem rotineira.
As universidades americanas podem instituir mais programas de intercâmbio para estudantes e professores.
As fundações podem apoiar o de-senvolvimento de instituições de estudos americanos em países muçulmanos ou programas de melhoramento do profissionalismo de jornalistas. Podem apoiar o ensino do inglês e financiar intercâmbios de estudantes.
Resumindo, há muitos caminhos para uma estratégia eficaz a longo prazo para criar recursos de poder de atracção e promover as condições para o desenvolvimento da democracia.
A resposta à recente catástrofe do tsunami na Ásia é um caso concreto. O Presidente George W. Bush ofereceu - embora atrasado - 350 mil milhões de dólares para ajuda às vítimas e enviou emissários de alto nível para a região.
Houve também um apoio privado substancial da parte de organizações de caridade e não lucrativas americanas. As imagens de soldados americanos a combater no Iraque foram suplantadas por imagens da América a distribuir ajuda às vítimas da catástrofe.
Mas é essencial que haja uma continuidade eficaz. Os anúncios prévios de Bush sobre o aumento do desenvolvimento da assistência e de esforços mais notórios para combater o HIV/Sida em África não foram apenas imperativos morais mas também investimentos importantes no poder de atracção da América.
Infelizmente, os fundos necessários para implementar estas iniciativas não fluíram tão rapidamente como a retórica. Igualmente importante, nenhum destes esforços ou nenhuma diplomacia pública será eficaz a não ser que o estilo e a substância das políticas dos EUA sejam consistentes com uma mensagem democrática mais alargada.
Isto significa que a tarefa mais importante de Condoleezza Rice como secretária de Estado será dar à política externa um estilo mais consultivo enquanto procura uma solução política para o Iraque e progressos para a paz no Médio Oriente.
Só então ela será capaz de começar a tarefa de recuperação da reputação abalada da América, apoiando a sua negligenciada diplomacia pública.
