1.10.2005
North Korea: Amnesty for the Kims and their kith
«International Herald Tribune»
January 8-9, 2005
Andrei Lankov [Korean affairs specialist at the Australian National University, Canberra]
One has to feel a bit of sympathy for North Korean leaders. Yes, they run a brutal dictatorship, but they are also victims of their own system. They know their system doesn't work, but they have no decent exit strategy. This is a disaster, for them and for their hapless subjects.
As somebody who witnessed the collapse of the Soviet system from within, I can testify that popular discontent was only one of many factors. The final blow to the Communist system was dealt when its elite decided that it would make sense to jettison their formal allegiance to Communist ideology (by the 1980s, few of them believed it in any case). Politically this proved wise: Many of these people are still in power in most post-Soviet states.
Why did North Korean leaders not follow suit? After all, the born-again capitalists of Russia or Ukraine or Kazakhstan now enjoy standards of living no top-level Communist bureaucrat could dream of.
Alas, in North Korea this turn of events is prevented by the presence of the problem known as South Korea. The very existence of this affluent and free country makes serious attempts at reform in the North politically risky. Reforms in other Communist countries, like China or Vietnam, led to a fast economic recovery. But this recovery was possible in dramatically different political circumstances: There was no "South China" (Taiwan is way too small), and South Vietnam went out of business 30 years ago.
The North Korean elite seems to believe that large-scale reforms would lead to disaster. They are probably right. If, as a result of reforms, ordinary North Koreans start learning more about South Korean prosperity and become less fearful of persecution, what will stop them from behaving the way East Germans did in 1990? In North Korea, unification with the South will be seen by a majority as a quick fix for all their problems.
Then what would be the fate of North Korea's leaders? Unlike their ex-Soviet comrades, they have few if any ways to transform themselves into successful capitalists or democratic politicians. Even if they manage to follow the example of the new Russian super-rich and stea... sorry, privatize state-owned companies, these rusty, antiquated plants will not be of great value, especially if large South Korean conglomerates move in. Capitalism in the North will be built by the managers of Samsung and LG Korea, not by born-again Communist apparatchiks.
And then there is a fear of persecution. This is not paranoia. The regime has committed many crimes. For decades, the North Korean population has been treated with a systematic ferocity the world has not seen since the collapse of Pol Pot's Kampuchea. Torture is a normal part of any investigation, and the families of more serious political criminals are also sent to prison. About 200,000 people are incarcerated in prison camps which rival Stalin's in their brutality.
The Communist bosses cannot even hope to run and find asylum somewhere. Even if a country like Russia or China agreed to accept them (and that's a big if), there are few chances that they would be safe if Seoul demands their extradition. We saw it before when the former East German strongman, Erich Honecker, sought asylum in Moscow but was arrested and extradited by a new Russian government. Moscow didn't feel much loyalty for a man who had been Moscow's best (and very efficient) ally for decades.
Thus the North Korean elite is cornered. These people do not want to tamper with the existing system, since they are afraid it would collapse. They have nothing to gain and everything to lose - not only their privilege and power, but also their freedom and perhaps even their lives.
They know how they would treat the South Korean elite if they won, and they do not see why they would be treated differently by a victorious South. This means they have to continue with their policies, believing that their choice is kill or be killed. So the government does its best to keep the system going, at a cost of many human lives and dangerous international brinkmanship.
What can be done? The short answer is amnesty. People who run the country should be granted immunity from persecution for all crimes committed during the 60-odd years of their rule. I am fully aware that we are talking about people who were in many respects as bad as Stalin and Hitler. But amnesty is necessary - not for them, of course, but for countless people whose lives would be so much better if the North Korean leaders were less persistent in their rejection of reforms.
North Korean leaders are unlikely to take a promise of amnesty at face value. Hence to make such a promise believable, it should be public, unequivocal and all-inclusive, leaving as few loopholes for future revenge-seekers as possible.
Perhaps international involvement will be necessary. The overthrown leaders will not feel too secure in their native land where they spilled so much blood, and they are likely to become a political burden for their former patrons in Moscow and Beijing. Thus it will probably help if some neutral country agrees to provide the Kims and their confidants with the right to stay there, freely spending their ill-gotten millions.
This sounds quite cynical. But it's a compromise that would save many lives. The North Korea's leaders' stubbornness has contributed to huge numbers of deaths in the famines of 1996 to 1999 (between some 600,000 and 900,000 perished), and it played a major role in the development of a nuclear crisis. So it might make sense to let a few overweight and retired executioners spend the rest of lives somewhere else.
January 8-9, 2005
Andrei Lankov [Korean affairs specialist at the Australian National University, Canberra]
One has to feel a bit of sympathy for North Korean leaders. Yes, they run a brutal dictatorship, but they are also victims of their own system. They know their system doesn't work, but they have no decent exit strategy. This is a disaster, for them and for their hapless subjects.
As somebody who witnessed the collapse of the Soviet system from within, I can testify that popular discontent was only one of many factors. The final blow to the Communist system was dealt when its elite decided that it would make sense to jettison their formal allegiance to Communist ideology (by the 1980s, few of them believed it in any case). Politically this proved wise: Many of these people are still in power in most post-Soviet states.
Why did North Korean leaders not follow suit? After all, the born-again capitalists of Russia or Ukraine or Kazakhstan now enjoy standards of living no top-level Communist bureaucrat could dream of.
Alas, in North Korea this turn of events is prevented by the presence of the problem known as South Korea. The very existence of this affluent and free country makes serious attempts at reform in the North politically risky. Reforms in other Communist countries, like China or Vietnam, led to a fast economic recovery. But this recovery was possible in dramatically different political circumstances: There was no "South China" (Taiwan is way too small), and South Vietnam went out of business 30 years ago.
The North Korean elite seems to believe that large-scale reforms would lead to disaster. They are probably right. If, as a result of reforms, ordinary North Koreans start learning more about South Korean prosperity and become less fearful of persecution, what will stop them from behaving the way East Germans did in 1990? In North Korea, unification with the South will be seen by a majority as a quick fix for all their problems.
Then what would be the fate of North Korea's leaders? Unlike their ex-Soviet comrades, they have few if any ways to transform themselves into successful capitalists or democratic politicians. Even if they manage to follow the example of the new Russian super-rich and stea... sorry, privatize state-owned companies, these rusty, antiquated plants will not be of great value, especially if large South Korean conglomerates move in. Capitalism in the North will be built by the managers of Samsung and LG Korea, not by born-again Communist apparatchiks.
And then there is a fear of persecution. This is not paranoia. The regime has committed many crimes. For decades, the North Korean population has been treated with a systematic ferocity the world has not seen since the collapse of Pol Pot's Kampuchea. Torture is a normal part of any investigation, and the families of more serious political criminals are also sent to prison. About 200,000 people are incarcerated in prison camps which rival Stalin's in their brutality.
The Communist bosses cannot even hope to run and find asylum somewhere. Even if a country like Russia or China agreed to accept them (and that's a big if), there are few chances that they would be safe if Seoul demands their extradition. We saw it before when the former East German strongman, Erich Honecker, sought asylum in Moscow but was arrested and extradited by a new Russian government. Moscow didn't feel much loyalty for a man who had been Moscow's best (and very efficient) ally for decades.
Thus the North Korean elite is cornered. These people do not want to tamper with the existing system, since they are afraid it would collapse. They have nothing to gain and everything to lose - not only their privilege and power, but also their freedom and perhaps even their lives.
They know how they would treat the South Korean elite if they won, and they do not see why they would be treated differently by a victorious South. This means they have to continue with their policies, believing that their choice is kill or be killed. So the government does its best to keep the system going, at a cost of many human lives and dangerous international brinkmanship.
What can be done? The short answer is amnesty. People who run the country should be granted immunity from persecution for all crimes committed during the 60-odd years of their rule. I am fully aware that we are talking about people who were in many respects as bad as Stalin and Hitler. But amnesty is necessary - not for them, of course, but for countless people whose lives would be so much better if the North Korean leaders were less persistent in their rejection of reforms.
North Korean leaders are unlikely to take a promise of amnesty at face value. Hence to make such a promise believable, it should be public, unequivocal and all-inclusive, leaving as few loopholes for future revenge-seekers as possible.
Perhaps international involvement will be necessary. The overthrown leaders will not feel too secure in their native land where they spilled so much blood, and they are likely to become a political burden for their former patrons in Moscow and Beijing. Thus it will probably help if some neutral country agrees to provide the Kims and their confidants with the right to stay there, freely spending their ill-gotten millions.
This sounds quite cynical. But it's a compromise that would save many lives. The North Korea's leaders' stubbornness has contributed to huge numbers of deaths in the famines of 1996 to 1999 (between some 600,000 and 900,000 perished), and it played a major role in the development of a nuclear crisis. So it might make sense to let a few overweight and retired executioners spend the rest of lives somewhere else.
