1.05.2005
Soft-power victories
William Pfaff
Wednesday, January 5, 2005
«International Herald Tribune»
The two most important international developments in 2004, shaping things to come, were America's inability to dominate the insurrection in Iraq, and Europe's abandonment of its original idea of "Europe."
.
The United States began 2004 as the world's uncontested superpower (indeed its "hyperpower," as the French had said). It was held powerful enough to do virtually anything it set out to do. It ended the year militarily stalemated in Iraq, its available forces tied up defending themselves from attack by terrorist insurgents. The new Iraqi security forces, which it had spent the year training to replace Americans as protectors of elections this month and of a new Iraqi provisional government, were to take control of the security of their own country so that American combat forces could go home; but that is not happening.
.
The practical consequences of this failure for Washington's Middle Eastern policy and for George W. Bush's war against terror are serious, but the indirect and symbolic consequences are worse.
.
What will constitute real and relevant power in 2005? American land and air power seized Baghdad in a few days in 2003 because there was no airpower and little serious Iraqi ground force to defend Baghdad. The American shock- and-awe attack caused Iraq's infrastructure to collapse and brought on civil disorder and social breakdown, turning victory into lingering and debilitating failure. This alienated the population and drew foreign Muslim jihadists and militants to Iraq to kill Americans.
.
Washington intended a pacified and democratic Iraq. It got a dirty war it has been unable to stop.
.
During 2004, the "soft power" of the Europeans proved much more effective in shaping international events than American hard power. The irrelevance of America's military power to its real problems still goes unacknowledged.
.
European soft power, during this same year, made a fundamental change in the troubled Balkans by incorporating states in the region into the European Union, and it hopes to have taken a decisive step toward restoring Muslim-Western relations by offering EU membership to Turkey. At the end of the year, Europe's "soft" intervention to consolidate the independence of Ukraine altered the contours of Russian as well as Ukrainian political and cultural geography. That, of course, is the optimistic judgment on what Europe did this year.
.
The Yugoslav succession crisis is still not over, and Albanian irredentism is still unresolved. The promise to Turkey could fail - or be betrayed - and Europe's opening to Islam could close, with unhappy consequences for Western Europe's Islamic minorities.
.
Moreover, successful deployment of the European Union's soft power has been achieved at the cost of destroying the European Union itself, as it has existed until now. The original European ambition to form an integrated political union has had to be abandoned. A new "Europe" has been substituted, whose nature and limits are still undetermined.
.
Power can no longer be defined in conventional ways. Americans have recently argued that European soft power is fine, but that it depends on American hard power. Why should this be so? What is the threat against which the United States defends Europe?
.
Not Iraq, surely. Not Iran - the Europeans are dealing with Iran in their own way and seem to see no threat to themselves. North Korea? China? Vladimir Putin's Russia? Why should any of these want to attack Europe, a distant trading, industrial and aerospace giant - and if it ever had to become one, potentially a military giant?
.
Only militant Islam is a threat in 2005, and everyone knows that its foreign targets are the United States and Israel, while its ultimate aim is the religious radicalization of Islamic civilization itself, which is an impossible goal. So who is defending whom against what in 2005?
.PARIS Global security
.
.
.
The two most important international developments in 2004, shaping things to come, were America's inability to dominate the insurrection in Iraq, and Europe's abandonment of its original idea of "Europe."
.
The United States began 2004 as the world's uncontested superpower (indeed its "hyperpower," as the French had said). It was held powerful enough to do virtually anything it set out to do. It ended the year militarily stalemated in Iraq, its available forces tied up defending themselves from attack by terrorist insurgents. The new Iraqi security forces, which it had spent the year training to replace Americans as protectors of elections this month and of a new Iraqi provisional government, were to take control of the security of their own country so that American combat forces could go home; but that is not happening.
.
The practical consequences of this failure for Washington's Middle Eastern policy and for George W. Bush's war against terror are serious, but the indirect and symbolic consequences are worse.
.
What will constitute real and relevant power in 2005? American land and air power seized Baghdad in a few days in 2003 because there was no airpower and little serious Iraqi ground force to defend Baghdad. The American shock- and-awe attack caused Iraq's infrastructure to collapse and brought on civil disorder and social breakdown, turning victory into lingering and debilitating failure. This alienated the population and drew foreign Muslim jihadists and militants to Iraq to kill Americans.
.
Washington intended a pacified and democratic Iraq. It got a dirty war it has been unable to stop.
.
During 2004, the "soft power" of the Europeans proved much more effective in shaping international events than American hard power. The irrelevance of America's military power to its real problems still goes unacknowledged.
.
European soft power, during this same year, made a fundamental change in the troubled Balkans by incorporating states in the region into the European Union, and it hopes to have taken a decisive step toward restoring Muslim-Western relations by offering EU membership to Turkey. At the end of the year, Europe's "soft" intervention to consolidate the independence of Ukraine altered the contours of Russian as well as Ukrainian political and cultural geography. That, of course, is the optimistic judgment on what Europe did this year.
.
The Yugoslav succession crisis is still not over, and Albanian irredentism is still unresolved. The promise to Turkey could fail - or be betrayed - and Europe's opening to Islam could close, with unhappy consequences for Western Europe's Islamic minorities.
.
Moreover, successful deployment of the European Union's soft power has been achieved at the cost of destroying the European Union itself, as it has existed until now. The original European ambition to form an integrated political union has had to be abandoned. A new "Europe" has been substituted, whose nature and limits are still undetermined.
.
Power can no longer be defined in conventional ways. Americans have recently argued that European soft power is fine, but that it depends on American hard power. Why should this be so? What is the threat against which the United States defends Europe?
.
Not Iraq, surely. Not Iran - the Europeans are dealing with Iran in their own way and seem to see no threat to themselves. North Korea? China? Vladimir Putin's Russia? Why should any of these want to attack Europe, a distant trading, industrial and aerospace giant - and if it ever had to become one, potentially a military giant?
.
Only militant Islam is a threat in 2005, and everyone knows that its foreign targets are the United States and Israel, while its ultimate aim is the religious radicalization of Islamic civilization itself, which is an impossible goal. So who is defending whom against what in 2005?
.PARIS Global security
.
.
.
The two most important international developments in 2004, shaping things to come, were America's inability to dominate the insurrection in Iraq, and Europe's abandonment of its original idea of "Europe."
.
The United States began 2004 as the world's uncontested superpower (indeed its "hyperpower," as the French had said). It was held powerful enough to do virtually anything it set out to do. It ended the year militarily stalemated in Iraq, its available forces tied up defending themselves from attack by terrorist insurgents. The new Iraqi security forces, which it had spent the year training to replace Americans as protectors of elections this month and of a new Iraqi provisional government, were to take control of the security of their own country so that American combat forces could go home; but that is not happening.
.
The practical consequences of this failure for Washington's Middle Eastern policy and for George W. Bush's war against terror are serious, but the indirect and symbolic consequences are worse.
.
What will constitute real and relevant power in 2005? American land and air power seized Baghdad in a few days in 2003 because there was no airpower and little serious Iraqi ground force to defend Baghdad. The American shock- and-awe attack caused Iraq's infrastructure to collapse and brought on civil disorder and social breakdown, turning victory into lingering and debilitating failure. This alienated the population and drew foreign Muslim jihadists and militants to Iraq to kill Americans.
.
Washington intended a pacified and democratic Iraq. It got a dirty war it has been unable to stop.
.
During 2004, the "soft power" of the Europeans proved much more effective in shaping international events than American hard power. The irrelevance of America's military power to its real problems still goes unacknowledged.
.
European soft power, during this same year, made a fundamental change in the troubled Balkans by incorporating states in the region into the European Union, and it hopes to have taken a decisive step toward restoring Muslim-Western relations by offering EU membership to Turkey. At the end of the year, Europe's "soft" intervention to consolidate the independence of Ukraine altered the contours of Russian as well as Ukrainian political and cultural geography. That, of course, is the optimistic judgment on what Europe did this year.
.
The Yugoslav succession crisis is still not over, and Albanian irredentism is still unresolved. The promise to Turkey could fail - or be betrayed - and Europe's opening to Islam could close, with unhappy consequences for Western Europe's Islamic minorities.
.
Moreover, successful deployment of the European Union's soft power has been achieved at the cost of destroying the European Union itself, as it has existed until now. The original European ambition to form an integrated political union has had to be abandoned. A new "Europe" has been substituted, whose nature and limits are still undetermined.
.
Power can no longer be defined in conventional ways. Americans have recently argued that European soft power is fine, but that it depends on American hard power. Why should this be so? What is the threat against which the United States defends Europe?
.
Not Iraq, surely. Not Iran - the Europeans are dealing with Iran in their own way and seem to see no threat to themselves. North Korea? China? Vladimir Putin's Russia? Why should any of these want to attack Europe, a distant trading, industrial and aerospace giant - and if it ever had to become one, potentially a military giant?
.
Only militant Islam is a threat in 2005, and everyone knows that its foreign targets are the United States and Israel, while its ultimate aim is the religious radicalization of Islamic civilization itself, which is an impossible goal. So who is defending whom against what in 2005?
.
Wednesday, January 5, 2005
«International Herald Tribune»
The two most important international developments in 2004, shaping things to come, were America's inability to dominate the insurrection in Iraq, and Europe's abandonment of its original idea of "Europe."
.
The United States began 2004 as the world's uncontested superpower (indeed its "hyperpower," as the French had said). It was held powerful enough to do virtually anything it set out to do. It ended the year militarily stalemated in Iraq, its available forces tied up defending themselves from attack by terrorist insurgents. The new Iraqi security forces, which it had spent the year training to replace Americans as protectors of elections this month and of a new Iraqi provisional government, were to take control of the security of their own country so that American combat forces could go home; but that is not happening.
.
The practical consequences of this failure for Washington's Middle Eastern policy and for George W. Bush's war against terror are serious, but the indirect and symbolic consequences are worse.
.
What will constitute real and relevant power in 2005? American land and air power seized Baghdad in a few days in 2003 because there was no airpower and little serious Iraqi ground force to defend Baghdad. The American shock- and-awe attack caused Iraq's infrastructure to collapse and brought on civil disorder and social breakdown, turning victory into lingering and debilitating failure. This alienated the population and drew foreign Muslim jihadists and militants to Iraq to kill Americans.
.
Washington intended a pacified and democratic Iraq. It got a dirty war it has been unable to stop.
.
During 2004, the "soft power" of the Europeans proved much more effective in shaping international events than American hard power. The irrelevance of America's military power to its real problems still goes unacknowledged.
.
European soft power, during this same year, made a fundamental change in the troubled Balkans by incorporating states in the region into the European Union, and it hopes to have taken a decisive step toward restoring Muslim-Western relations by offering EU membership to Turkey. At the end of the year, Europe's "soft" intervention to consolidate the independence of Ukraine altered the contours of Russian as well as Ukrainian political and cultural geography. That, of course, is the optimistic judgment on what Europe did this year.
.
The Yugoslav succession crisis is still not over, and Albanian irredentism is still unresolved. The promise to Turkey could fail - or be betrayed - and Europe's opening to Islam could close, with unhappy consequences for Western Europe's Islamic minorities.
.
Moreover, successful deployment of the European Union's soft power has been achieved at the cost of destroying the European Union itself, as it has existed until now. The original European ambition to form an integrated political union has had to be abandoned. A new "Europe" has been substituted, whose nature and limits are still undetermined.
.
Power can no longer be defined in conventional ways. Americans have recently argued that European soft power is fine, but that it depends on American hard power. Why should this be so? What is the threat against which the United States defends Europe?
.
Not Iraq, surely. Not Iran - the Europeans are dealing with Iran in their own way and seem to see no threat to themselves. North Korea? China? Vladimir Putin's Russia? Why should any of these want to attack Europe, a distant trading, industrial and aerospace giant - and if it ever had to become one, potentially a military giant?
.
Only militant Islam is a threat in 2005, and everyone knows that its foreign targets are the United States and Israel, while its ultimate aim is the religious radicalization of Islamic civilization itself, which is an impossible goal. So who is defending whom against what in 2005?
.PARIS Global security
.
.
.
The two most important international developments in 2004, shaping things to come, were America's inability to dominate the insurrection in Iraq, and Europe's abandonment of its original idea of "Europe."
.
The United States began 2004 as the world's uncontested superpower (indeed its "hyperpower," as the French had said). It was held powerful enough to do virtually anything it set out to do. It ended the year militarily stalemated in Iraq, its available forces tied up defending themselves from attack by terrorist insurgents. The new Iraqi security forces, which it had spent the year training to replace Americans as protectors of elections this month and of a new Iraqi provisional government, were to take control of the security of their own country so that American combat forces could go home; but that is not happening.
.
The practical consequences of this failure for Washington's Middle Eastern policy and for George W. Bush's war against terror are serious, but the indirect and symbolic consequences are worse.
.
What will constitute real and relevant power in 2005? American land and air power seized Baghdad in a few days in 2003 because there was no airpower and little serious Iraqi ground force to defend Baghdad. The American shock- and-awe attack caused Iraq's infrastructure to collapse and brought on civil disorder and social breakdown, turning victory into lingering and debilitating failure. This alienated the population and drew foreign Muslim jihadists and militants to Iraq to kill Americans.
.
Washington intended a pacified and democratic Iraq. It got a dirty war it has been unable to stop.
.
During 2004, the "soft power" of the Europeans proved much more effective in shaping international events than American hard power. The irrelevance of America's military power to its real problems still goes unacknowledged.
.
European soft power, during this same year, made a fundamental change in the troubled Balkans by incorporating states in the region into the European Union, and it hopes to have taken a decisive step toward restoring Muslim-Western relations by offering EU membership to Turkey. At the end of the year, Europe's "soft" intervention to consolidate the independence of Ukraine altered the contours of Russian as well as Ukrainian political and cultural geography. That, of course, is the optimistic judgment on what Europe did this year.
.
The Yugoslav succession crisis is still not over, and Albanian irredentism is still unresolved. The promise to Turkey could fail - or be betrayed - and Europe's opening to Islam could close, with unhappy consequences for Western Europe's Islamic minorities.
.
Moreover, successful deployment of the European Union's soft power has been achieved at the cost of destroying the European Union itself, as it has existed until now. The original European ambition to form an integrated political union has had to be abandoned. A new "Europe" has been substituted, whose nature and limits are still undetermined.
.
Power can no longer be defined in conventional ways. Americans have recently argued that European soft power is fine, but that it depends on American hard power. Why should this be so? What is the threat against which the United States defends Europe?
.
Not Iraq, surely. Not Iran - the Europeans are dealing with Iran in their own way and seem to see no threat to themselves. North Korea? China? Vladimir Putin's Russia? Why should any of these want to attack Europe, a distant trading, industrial and aerospace giant - and if it ever had to become one, potentially a military giant?
.
Only militant Islam is a threat in 2005, and everyone knows that its foreign targets are the United States and Israel, while its ultimate aim is the religious radicalization of Islamic civilization itself, which is an impossible goal. So who is defending whom against what in 2005?
.PARIS Global security
.
.
.
The two most important international developments in 2004, shaping things to come, were America's inability to dominate the insurrection in Iraq, and Europe's abandonment of its original idea of "Europe."
.
The United States began 2004 as the world's uncontested superpower (indeed its "hyperpower," as the French had said). It was held powerful enough to do virtually anything it set out to do. It ended the year militarily stalemated in Iraq, its available forces tied up defending themselves from attack by terrorist insurgents. The new Iraqi security forces, which it had spent the year training to replace Americans as protectors of elections this month and of a new Iraqi provisional government, were to take control of the security of their own country so that American combat forces could go home; but that is not happening.
.
The practical consequences of this failure for Washington's Middle Eastern policy and for George W. Bush's war against terror are serious, but the indirect and symbolic consequences are worse.
.
What will constitute real and relevant power in 2005? American land and air power seized Baghdad in a few days in 2003 because there was no airpower and little serious Iraqi ground force to defend Baghdad. The American shock- and-awe attack caused Iraq's infrastructure to collapse and brought on civil disorder and social breakdown, turning victory into lingering and debilitating failure. This alienated the population and drew foreign Muslim jihadists and militants to Iraq to kill Americans.
.
Washington intended a pacified and democratic Iraq. It got a dirty war it has been unable to stop.
.
During 2004, the "soft power" of the Europeans proved much more effective in shaping international events than American hard power. The irrelevance of America's military power to its real problems still goes unacknowledged.
.
European soft power, during this same year, made a fundamental change in the troubled Balkans by incorporating states in the region into the European Union, and it hopes to have taken a decisive step toward restoring Muslim-Western relations by offering EU membership to Turkey. At the end of the year, Europe's "soft" intervention to consolidate the independence of Ukraine altered the contours of Russian as well as Ukrainian political and cultural geography. That, of course, is the optimistic judgment on what Europe did this year.
.
The Yugoslav succession crisis is still not over, and Albanian irredentism is still unresolved. The promise to Turkey could fail - or be betrayed - and Europe's opening to Islam could close, with unhappy consequences for Western Europe's Islamic minorities.
.
Moreover, successful deployment of the European Union's soft power has been achieved at the cost of destroying the European Union itself, as it has existed until now. The original European ambition to form an integrated political union has had to be abandoned. A new "Europe" has been substituted, whose nature and limits are still undetermined.
.
Power can no longer be defined in conventional ways. Americans have recently argued that European soft power is fine, but that it depends on American hard power. Why should this be so? What is the threat against which the United States defends Europe?
.
Not Iraq, surely. Not Iran - the Europeans are dealing with Iran in their own way and seem to see no threat to themselves. North Korea? China? Vladimir Putin's Russia? Why should any of these want to attack Europe, a distant trading, industrial and aerospace giant - and if it ever had to become one, potentially a military giant?
.
Only militant Islam is a threat in 2005, and everyone knows that its foreign targets are the United States and Israel, while its ultimate aim is the religious radicalization of Islamic civilization itself, which is an impossible goal. So who is defending whom against what in 2005?
.
